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Water is an extremely difficult resource to manage. Not only 
does it naturally move through the air, over the land, and under the 
ground, but each aspect of this movement is subject to changes 
caused by the environmental alterations of man. Since California's 
earliest occupation, water resources have been manipulated and 
utilized to serve mankind's needs. Each society identified its goals 
and produced public policies which reflected its cultural convictions 
and technological adaptations. Current trends indicate that the once 
abundant resource is becoming increasingly scarce as California's 
population continues to grow and the old politics of water-resource 
development become obsolete.
Advances in scientific knowledge regarding hydrological systems 
have heightened the public's awareness of many of the 
environmental and socio-economic problems caused by water 
resource development. This enlightenment has complicated the 
water allocation process, forcing many Californians to search for new 
sources of water. Increased political pressures caused by an 
increased societal concern for environmental preservation have 
forced public policy experts to assess reallocations of developed 
supplies through water transfers.
This inquiry seeks to: 1) Assess the characteristics, strengths,
and weaknesses of California's past water adjudication systems; 2) 
Identify the goals of an efficient and equitable water allocation 
system; and 3) Explore the comparative advantages of two modern 
distributional systems: The Public Trust Doctrine and water
marketing.
The conclusions of this study are: 1) Water allocation problems
in California are a result of mismanagement rather than water 
scarcity; 2) Good allocation policy requires precise definitions of law 
and public policy; 3) Water transfers through water markets is the 
best means of combining divergent public interests with efficient 
allocation and equitable distribution.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
P r o b le m
Water moves throughout the atmosphere, biosphere, and 
lithosphere in the hydrological cycle. This continuous movement 
alters the physical, chemical, biological, and aesthetic properties of a 
given water resource. Human beings influence and facilitate these 
hydrological changes, both directly and indirectly, through their 
social interpretations and physical manipulations of land, air, and 
water. However, as social interpretations of humankind's 
relationship with the environment change, so must the laws and 
policies guiding resource manipulation. Historically, Indians, 
Spaniards, miners, farmers, and industrialists created water laws 
which conformed to their needs and reflected their perceptions of 
California's environment. Consequently, each culture has left its 
imprint upon California's water policies. In recent years, Californians 
redirected their environmental priorities from resource development 
and consumption to resource protection.^ As a result, water policies
^This new attitude evolved from the earlier conservation and 
preservation movements of such people as Gifford Pinchot, Theodore 
Roosevelt, John Wesley Powell, and John Muir. They were highlighted in 1970 
by Richard Nixon when he signed the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). See  Henry P. Caulfield, "The Conservation and Environmental 
Movements: An Historical Analysis," Environmental Politics and Policy, edited
by James P. Lester, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989), 13-
56. Hereafter, Caulfield, "Conservation," Environm ental P o litic s .
are emerging from 230 years of river diversion, dam construction, 
and wetlands reclamation into an era of previously developed water- 
resource reallocation.
This new attitude has produced a conflict between two 
methods of reallocation: the “Public Trust Doctrine” and “water
marketing.” Although both aim to reallocate California’s scarce water 
resources, they are dissimilar in their approaches. The Public Trust 
Doctrine allows judicial intervention in reallocation debates, whereby 
the courts decide to whom and for what purpose(s) the water 
resource shall be allocated. On the other hand, water marketing is a 
legislatively administered and primarily free-enterprise method for 
voluntary and private reallocation. This growing conflict has created 
an aura of uncertainty regarding water policy and law among water- 
right holders and, hence, has likely prevented reapportionment from 
occurring.2
Purpose and Procedure
The science of geography deals with location, place, movement, 
human/environment interactions, and regions on the surface of the 
earth. The content of a region is inherently dynamic, constantly 
changing as physical, biological, and cultural processes interact over 
time. Therefore, in order to understand California’s current 
hydrogeography and water policies, these dynamic mechanisms must 
be examined. In this enquiry, I shall use historical geographical
^Zachary McCormick, "Institutional Barriers to Water Marketing in the 
West," W ater Resources Bulletin 30 (November/December 1994), 953.
H ereafter, McCormick, "Institutional Barriers,"
research techniques to correlate California's cultural development 
with contemporary water policies.
There are six basic steps in historical geographical research:
One, describing the variation in the physical environment at different 
periods in time. Two, describing the relationship between human 
beings and the physical environment at different periods in time. 
Three, applying generic insights by categorizing and classifying 
different physical and human environments. Four, presenting a 
genetic reconstruction of historical changes in cultural land-use 
patterns and the policies associated with these patterns. Five, 
drawing upon the results from the genetic investigation to analyze 
covariant patterns between cultures and environment. Finally, to 
integrate the historical covariant patterns with the contemporary 
culture's dynamics and structure.^ This final stage will explore the 
comparative advantages of the Public Trust Doctrine and water 
marketing.
The procedures for this enquiry are as follows. First, I shall 
use historical descriptions and modern interpretations to summarize 
the natural environment of California, outlining the important 
hydrological features of the landscape. These include landforms, 
precipitation patterns, and watershed systems. Then, I shall describe 
the current landscape and its hydrological patterns. In doing so, I
^For information on the process of historical geographical enquiry se e  
Edward A. Ackerman, "Geography as a Fundamental Research Discipline," 
(Chicago, Illinois: The Department of Geography, The University of Chicago,
1958) and National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, 
"The Science of Geography," Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Geography, 
(Washington, D C., 1965).
shall emphasize water supply by grouping systems and producing 
generalized hydrological regions.
Second, I shall give an historical geographical description of the 
development of the current system of California water rights, water 
policy, and water law as they relate to various cultural influences. 
Past cultures developed water-allocation systems in relation to their 
environmental surroundings, cultural values, and socio-economic 
concerns. Therefore, since many of the existing water laws in
California are derived from ancient cultures, an understanding of
these concerns is necessary in order to understand their current 
applications. The Public Trust Doctrine and water marketing both 
combine many earlier ideals and water laws with contemporary 
political demands.
Third, 1 shall compare and contrast the Public Trust Doctrine 
with water marketing as a means of water reallocation. I shall use 
the water resource allocation model designed by Charles Howe,
Dennis R. Schurmeier, and W. Douglass Shaw as the foundation for
this discussion."* The model has five parts:
1. F lexib ilitv—allow water to be shifted in location, season, 
and purpose of use in response to changing social and 
economic conditions;
2. Secure expectations—gives water users a basis for 
making long-term investment and planning decisions;
3. Opportunitv costs—identifving and utilizing alternatives 
to resource use;
"^Charles W. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier, and W. Douglass Shaw, 
"Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water Markets,"
W ater Resources Research 22 (1986): 438-445. Hereafter, Howe, et al.,
"Innovative  A pproaches."
4. Predictability—rules of allocation and transfer should be
clear and not subject to unexpected changes;
5. Fairness—costs imposed upon primary, secondary, and
tertiary parties must be accounted for.
Each of these water-resource allocation elements are influenced by
the bio physical environment, the behavior of individuals and
groups, and the policies and laws adhered to by society.
This enquiry applies historical geographical research methods
to explain the genesis of California's current water policy and law. 
This research requires an understanding of the processes that cause 
environmental and socio-economic change. Historically, the agents of 
this change were primarily natural rather than cultural, as they are 
today. Understanding these relationships requires quantitative 
observations of physical phenomena in California's hydrological 
system. These facts will complement the qualitative historical 
analysis of social values, political organization, administrative 
methods, and technological development.
CHAPTER 2 
HYDROLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
California is an extraordinary place. Geographically, its 
extreme isolation, erratic climate, and regional diversity have played 
an integral part in shaping its unusual history. It offers an enormous 
variety of physical, climatic, geological, and vegetational 
combinations: extremely wet climates and extremely dry climates;
poor sandy soil and thick, fertile loams; the highest mountain in the 
Continental United States (Mount Whitney, 14,496 feet) and the 
lowest point in the entire country (Death Valley, -282 feet); scrub 
brush in Southern California and the Giant Sequoias in the Sierra 
Nevada Mountain Range. These diverse physical features have set 
the stage for a diversity of peoples who, in turn, have manipulated 
and exploited California's resources to satisfy their cultural needs.
California has five principal physical features: First and
foremost is its great size. California occupies 158,693 square miles of 
surface area making it the third largest state in the union. It extends 
north-south over nearly ten degrees of latitude, between the 32nd 
and 42nd parallels, forming over 1264 miles of coastline. Second, on 
the eastern side of the state, the lofty Sierra Nevadas isolate 
California along a 500-mile stretch from the rest of the continental 
United States. Third, the Coast Range, which parallels the Sierra
Nevadas, spans almost the entire western seaboard. These two 
mountain ranges confine the fourth feature, the Great Central Valley, 
constituting the heartland of California. The intermontane regions of 
the northeastern plateau and the southeastern deserts make up the 
final major topographic feature^ (fig. 1).
The mountains of the Coast Range average approximately 4000 
feet in height, but a few peaks in the northern Klamath mountains 
and the southern Transverse ranges extend from 9000 to 11,600 
feet. Inland more than forty peaks of the Sierra Nevadas exceed 
10,000 feet in height, and a dozen of those exceed 14,000 feet.^ 
Because of this natural barrier, the western slope of the Sierras 
extracts considerable moisture from Pacific storms, and is thereby 
replete with streams, rivers, and lakes. A large part of the alpine 
overland flow and ground water systems eventually wind their way 
into the Central Valley, to be intercepted by either the Sacramento or 
San Joaquin rivers (fig. 2). These two drainages constitute the state's 
largest navigable rivers.7
As James J. Parsons has pointed out, "It so happens that 
California’s arbitrarily conceived boundaries outline the only area of 
winter rain and summer drought in North America. "8 Rainfall in 
California normally occurs between late October and early May. In
5William L. Kahrl, ed., The California Water Atlas (Sacram ento :
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, 1979), 4, 10, 12, 14, 17. Hereafter 
Kahrl, California Water Atlas.
^Map of California. Raven Maps and Images. Allan Cartography, 
Medford Oregon 1992.
7Andrew Rolle, California A History. (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1963), 328. The word navigable, as will be explained later, has many
meanings. Hereafter, Rolle, California A History.
^James J. Parsons, "The Uniqueness of California," Am erican Ouarterlv 
7 (Spring 1955); 45-55.
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the state as a whole, the average annual precipitation is 23.88 
inches,^ but climatic diversity invalidates the significance of that 
average. California can be divided into ten natural hydrologie 
regions: These are the North Coast (NC); the San Francisco Bay (SF); 
the Central Coast (CC); the South Coast (SC); the Sacramento River 
(SR); the San Joaquin River (SJ); Tulare Lake (TL); North Lahontan 
(NL); South Lahontan (SL); and the Colorado River (CR)io (fig. 3). The 
average annual precipitation for these regions ranges from 51.0 
inches per year in the North Coast region to 5.5 inches per year in 
the Colorado River region. Moreover, in some areas of the North 
Coast region over 120 inches of precipitation accumulate each year, 
while in the Colorado Region less than one inch of precipitation in 
certain areas is not uncommon.
Once on the ground, the combined average of nearly 200 
million acre feet (MAF) of precipitation continues to progress through 
the hydrological cycle in three ways: It may re-enter the
atmosphere through évapotranspiration; become surface-water 
runoff; or percolate into the soil. In an average year, approximately 
119.5 MAF evapotranspires, while nearly 74 MAF flows through the 
system as surface runoff. Only about half of that runoff is avaiable 
for human c o n s u m p t i o n .  12 Ground water systems receive
^Kahrl, California W ater A tlas, supra note 5, 10.
I ̂ Raymond D. Hart, et al., California Water Plan Update. Department of 
Water Resources, November 1993. Bulletin 160-93, Vol. I, 49. Hereafter Hart, 
California Water Plan Update. Vol. I.
II  David Hornbeck, California Patterns: A Geographical and_ Historical
A tlas . (Mountainview, California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1983), 23. Hereafter
Hornbeck, California Patterns. See also Hart, California W ater Plan Update,
Vol. I, supra note 10, 49.
12Kahrl, California Water Atlas: supra note 5, 12
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approximately 6 . 5  M A F  of water in an average year (fig. 4 ) .  There 
are over 4 5 0  ground water basins within the state, storing 
approximately 8 5 0  M A F  of w a t e r ,  13 of which 8 0 0  M A F  resides in the 
Central Valley. However, experts agree that only 2 5 0  M A F  of this 
water could be reclaimed for use.^5
California's unique geographical configuration confines the 
majority of its water resources within the state boundaries. The 
major exceptions are the Colorado river in the south, the Klamath 
river in the north, and Lake Tahoe and the Truckee river basin in the 
east. The areal extent of all of the ground-water basins is not 
completely k n o w n , 17 and, therefore, many aquifers may have 
undiscovered hydrological connections outside of the state's political 
domain.
Droughts and floods have plagued California throughout its 
history. The recorded all-time low surface runoff was 15 MAF in 
1977 while the all-time high exceeded 135 MAF in 19831^ (fig. 4). 
Dendrochronological records indicate that significantly larger 
droughts are not uncommon for regions within California. Tree-ring
l^Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 49.
1^Gilbert L. Bertoldi, Richard H. Johnston, and K.D. Evenson. "Ground 
Water in the Central Valley, California—A Summary Report." U.S. Geological 
Survey Professional Paper 1401-A. United States Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1991, A l.
1 ̂ Department of Water Resources, Layperson’s Guide to California 
Ground W ater, prepared by the Water Education Foundation, 1986, 1-4. See also 
Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra 10, 85; McCormick, "Institutional 
Barriers," supra note 2; and Kahrl, California W ater A tlas, supra note 5.
^^Map of California. Raven Maps and Images. Allan Cartography, 
Medford, Oregon 1992.
^7Raymond D. Hart, et al., California's Ground W ater. Department of 
Water Resources, November 1990. Bulletin 118-80, 93.
Hart, California^W ater Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 47
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studies of California for a 360-year period indicate that the longest 
interval of minimum growth (reflecting an extended drought) was 
the sixty-one years from 1760-1820, whereas the decade between 
1935 and 1944 (with a minimum annual precipitation of nineteen 
inches) emerges as a period of maximum vegetative growth rarely 
approached in the past. Other lengthy periods of deficient 
precipitation were 1600-1625, 1720-1730, 1865-1885, and 1987- 
1992.19 These examples represent extremes, but none of the cycles 
are of predictable length and they vary from place to place with the 
result that while one area experiences drought another may be 
literally under water (table 1).
Throughout the state, there has always been danger of flood. 
During the Gold Rush days, the northern communities of Sacramento, 
Stockton, Oroville, and Marysville were plagued by massive winter 
inundations which sometimes burst through the artificial levees and 
dikes that confine the American, Feather, Sacramento, and San 
Joaquin r i v e r s .P a r a d o x ic a l l y ,  one of the most serious flood threats 
exists in semi-arid Southern California. In fact, Santa Anita Canyon, 
near Pasadena, once held a national record for rainfall: In 1938,
twenty-six inches of rain fell in a twenty-four hour p e r i o d . T h u s ,
 ̂^Harold C. Fritts and Geoffrey A. Gordon, "Annual Precipitation for 
California since 1600 Reconstructed from Western North American Tree 
Rings," California Department of Water Resources, (July 1980): 38-40. See also,
M. K. Hughes, et al.. Climate From Tree Rings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
20Rolle, California A History, supra note 7, 490-97. In 1983 and 1986, 
flooding again occurred on the Mokelumne, American, Sacramento and San 
Joaquin rivers. Floods have been forecasted for the spring runoff of 1995 as 
w ell.
Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert (New York: Penguin Books, 1986) , 55.
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Table 1.
Pre-1900 Dry Periods and Droughts since 1900
P e r io d L en gth R u n o ff
M A F /y e a r
1579 - 1582 4 12.4
1593 - 1595 3 9.3
1600 - 1625 26 13.2
1651 - 1655 5 12.3
1720 - 1730 1 1 12.6
1735 - 1737 3 12.2
1755 - 1760 6 13.3
1776 - 1778 3 12.1
1793 - 1795 3 10.7
1839 - 1841 3 12.9
1843 - 1846 4 12.3
1918 - 1920 3 1 2
1929 - 1934 6 9.8
1959 - 1962 4 13
1976 - 1977 2 6.6
1987 - 1992 6 10
1 6
great irregularity characterizes the “typical” precipitation pattern 
throughout California.
The geography of California during American Indian occupation 
was drastically different from what it is today. Indigenous cultures, 
which occupied the state for nearly 40,000 years before European 
con tact, 22 had neither the need nor the technology to substantially 
alter environmental systems. Although the native Californians, did 
use fire to flush game and refertilize lands, most of the region’s 
physical environment remained relatively static during their entire 
occupation.23 Hydrologically, the Central Valley consisted of several 
gigantic swamps. The two largest regions, the Tulare Lake region 
and the Bay/Del ta floodplain, were flooded every spring by massive 
surface runoff. Likewise, artesian wells flowing from saturated 
ground-water basins also helped flood the central lowlands. These 
floods deposited fertile alluvial soils which supported vigorous 
vegetative growth.
Historically, huge fresh water marshes and dense riparian 
forests lined every stream in the Central Valley and Pacific Coast. 
Along the San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, and San Diego coasts, 
salt marshes occupied the land adjacent to flooding rivers.24 
Perennial grasses and forbs, such as California needlegrass {Stipa  
pulchra)  and pine bluegrass (Poa scabrella)^ covered nearly the 
entire length of the Central Valley and followed river systems in the 
central and southern coastal regions, where today introduced
22por more information on this topic see Carter, E arlie r, infra note 28. 
23See generally A.L. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California 
(New York; Dover Publications, Inc., 1976). Hereafter, Kroeber, H a n d b o o k . 
24Hornbeck, C alifornia Patterns, supra note 11,14
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annuals, such as foxtail {Bromus rubens) and wild oats {Aventa  
fa tua),  dominate these habitats. 5̂ Riparian forests of phreatophytes, 
oaks, willows, and shrubs followed the paths of the river systems as 
well, while artesian springs supported numerous species of plants in 
isolated communities. The high water table and the annual floods 
supported the biological productivity of the river systems and their
related floodplains.26
The variety of vegetation also provided forage and habitat for a 
variety of animals. Herds of Tule elk and pronghorn antelope 
wandered the grasslands and riparian systems. Numerous species of 
fish, salmon in particular, used the myriad waterways to spawn, 
while beavers harvested the abundant vegetation. Grizzly bears and 
wolves preyed upon the foraging fish and game. Millions of 
migratory birds, including ducks, geese, egrets, and herons, used the 
natural swampland for feeding grounds en route to northern or 
southern destinations. During indigenous occupation, California was 
one of the most fertile and diverse biological regions in the world.2 7
From this brief overview one can see that perhaps the key 
word to describe California’s natural hydrogeography, as well as most 
of her other characteristics, is variety—indeed, grandiose and 
unpredictable variety. The vivid contrasts in climate, topography, 
and hydrology, combined with the unique characteristics of the 
plants, animals, and cultures that have previously occupied this land.
25Michael Barbour and William Dwight Billings, ed., North American 
Terrestrial Vegetation (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988), 266-283.
26ibid.
27$ee generally, Vinson Brown and George Lawrence, The Californian 
W ildlife Region (Healdsburg, California: Naturegraph Publishers, 1965).
1 8
all contribute to the convolution of present day water resource policy 
and law.
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CHAPTER 3
HUMAN SETTLEMENT AND WATER ADJUDICATION 
Ind igenous C aliforn ian s
American Indians settled California as early as 100,000 years 
ago, either by descending from Alaska after crossing the Bering Strait 
or ascending from Mesoamerica after migrating by boat from 
P o l y n e s i a . I n  any case, almost 500 groups with a total population 
of 275,000 to 310,000, inhabited the present state of California.^9 
Large villages clustered in four primary zû eas: along the Pacific
coast; along the lower courses of large streams; on the banks of small 
lakes below 4000 feet; and in the semi-arid and arid regions of the 
present-day Mojave Desert (fig. 5). Each settlement reflected the 
characteristics of the local environment, and always had a reliable 
water resource in close proximity—whether a stream, lake, or spring.
The settlement patterns of the California Indians reflect an 
incredibly diverse mixture of people and institutions adapted to 
various physical environments.30 The basis of California Indian
28George F. Carter, Earlier Than You Think. (College Station, Texas:
Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 3. Hereafter, Carter, E arlie r. While such 
an early date remains controversial, it is increasingly finding support in the 
archaeological record.
29Sherburne F. Cook, The Population of the California Indians 1769-1970 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1976), 14-
16, 33-34. Hereafter, Cook, California Indians.
30Kroeber, H andbook, supra note 23, throughout.
INDIGENOUS POPULATION 
DENSITY AT THE TIM E OF 
EUROPEAN CONTACT
Persons per square mile
11 or more 
6 - 1 0  
3 -5  
1 -2
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Q
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settlement was the sib, a small, self-governing, autonomous socio­
political group, usually identified by linguistic dialect.^i There were 
approximately 500 sibs containing populations ranging from 50 to 
1000 people. One important feature of the sib was its role as the 
basic landholding unit in indigenous society and, in turn, the 
foundation that lent character to the aboriginal landscape. Control of 
land was based upon occupancy and continued use.
California Indians were mostly fisherfolk and hunter-gatherers. 
They harvested what nature provided: salmon, acorns, and wild
game. Their existence depended upon a steady and recurrent source 
of food, over which the sib could claim exploitative rights. Unlike 
Europeans, who frequently established rivers as boundaries,
California Indians reserved the entire watershed of streams as 
natural territories. Such an outlook reflected economic as well as 
political considerations, for it ordinarily gave a native community 
control of both banks of a river or stream, providing easy access to 
the abundant game and fowl that sought out such water courses. It 
also meant for the community a greater variety of available 
resources. Water played the most significant role in village 
l o c a t i o n . 3 2  it was a simple concept: go to where the water was and
live beside it. Thus, the earliest Californians made little change in 
the landscape, but relied upon water resources and the surrounding 
ecosystems for survival,
Indian sibs that inhabited the southern semi-arid zones of 
California did manipulate water resources to “improve” their natural
31 Cook, C aliforn ia . Indians, supra 29.
32Robert F. Heizer, "The California Indians: Archaeology, Varieties of
Culture, Arts of Life," California Historical Society 41 (March 1962): 1-28.
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world. By 200 B.C., agricultural Indians such as the Owens Valley 
Paiutes built dams and canals and even maintained an irrigation 
h i e r a r c h y . 33 The head irrigator, called a tuvaijii'*, was responsible for 
the annual construction and destruction of dams and canals. Other 
groups, including the Chemehuevi, Maricopa, Mojave, and Yuma, 
cultivated the lower Colorado river, including the Imperial Valley, 
with similar resource m a n i p u l a t i o n . 3 4
Another aspect of early water systems was the absence among 
California Indians of private property rights in the use of water. The 
concept itself was completely alien, because water, like land, 
belonged to no individual, but rather was interconnected with all of 
nature and essential for both human and animal survival. Water use 
was reserved for the occupying group and the surrounding 
environment, for one depended upon the other. Such utopian 
wisdom notwithstanding, California Indians jealously defended their 
territories and, in doing so, they were also guarding the springs, 
streams, and rivers that watered those lands and attracted the 
wildlife that contributed to their survival. Viewed this way, water 
belonged  to a particular community and, especially in the more arid 
regions, might well have been the source of conflict and even 
w a r f a r e . 3 5  The public interests of the community were only 
considered for the groups that maintained resource control. Thus,
3 3John Ressier, "Indian and Spanish Water Control on New Spain's 
North West Frontier," Journal of the West 7 (January 1968): 10-17.
34por more information on the agricultural practices of California 
Indians see Kroeber, H an d b o o k , supra note 23, throughout.
35Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst Californians and Water 1770's- 
1990's (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 23-4, Hereafter,
Hundley, The Great Thirst.
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diversity in public interests was not a factor in interpreting water 
allocation.
Spanish  S ettlem en t
The rise of non-indigenous civilization in California began 
remarkably late because of its extreme geographical remoteness 
from Europe and Asia, and even from the original Spanish and British 
colonial settlements in the Western Hemishpere. The Spanish 
founded their first settlement on the Pacific Coast in 1519, at 
P a n a m a . 36 Not until 1769, two and a half centuries later, did Caspar 
de Portola establish Spain’s first permanent community in Alta 
California at San D ie g o .37 Slowly, they migrated up the coast to San 
Francisco, the northern limit of their New World colonies, without 
penetrating the interior regions of the state.3* Discovering that much 
of California, especially the southern regions, was similar to Old 
World Spain in both climate and topography. New Spain’s settlement 
patterns and socio-economic structures imitated traditional Spanish
p a t te r n s  a n d  s t r u c t u r e s .3 9
Spanish colonialists had three primary forms of settlement:
First, the religious missions, whose function was to convert 
indigenous Californians to Christianity. Second, the presidios, or 
military outposts, which were designed to defend New Spain from 
Indian uprisings and colonial aggression. Last, the pueblo, or civil
36warren L Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific N orth w est
1543-1819 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973). Hereafter,
Cook, Flood Tide.
37ibid.
38Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note 11, 40-1.
39cook, Flood Tide, supra note 36.
2 4
community, which assembled both Native Americans and Spanish 
immigrants into small towns. Each of these communities engaged in 
agricultural production and were always located on or near a source 
of fresh water. The pueblos, representing the majority of Spanish 
citizens, administered central control over the distribution and 
consumption of water resources. Dividing water among the missions, 
presidios, and pueblos, while simultaneously pacifying individual and 
societal goals, proved to be an immense task for the central 
authority.
The Spanish held the Catholic ideal that humankind held 
complete dominion over n a t u r e . T h i s  concept was not only rooted 
in Judeo-Christian traditions, but was also consistent with Phoenician, 
Greek, Roman, and Moorish influences upon the Iberian landscape.^ i 
It was a viewpoint that held if nature was to be useful, then nature 
had to be con t r o l l e d . T h e  Spanish occupation of a semi-arid 
landscape in Europe meant that water was already considered a 
highly valued resource, and those who controlled water resources 
controlled the entire Iberian Peninsula. Similarly, in New Spain, they 
realized that controlling water meant controlling the Native 
Americans and the lands they o c c u p i e d . ^  3
40lbid
Hundley. The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 27.
4^C.J. Glacken, Traces_on the Rhodian Shore:__ Nature and_Culture_in
Western Thought from Ancient Times to the end of the Eighteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
43For a more detailed analysis on the control of Native Americans 
through resource domination see Michael Meyer, Water in the Hispanic 
Southwest: A Social and Legal Historv. 1550-1850 (Tuscon, Arizona: University
of Arizona Press, 1984). Hereafter Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest.
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New Spains water law can be found in a document known as 
the "Plan of Pi tic. Fundamental to this plan was the principle that 
the residents of a pueblo share all of the water resources. Since 
water was “for the common benefit,” no one had a superior right that 
could be exercised to the detriment of others, including 
discrimination towards Native Americans. In fact, the Plan of Pitic 
stated that “...pastures, woodlands, waters, hunting grounds, fishing 
areas,...and other things [the pueblo] produces shall be for the 
common benefit of Spaniards and I n d ia n s .”45 As early as 1681, 
because of the growing confusion, Spain had been compelled to 
codify the enormous number of laws pertaining to the New World in 
the Recopilacion de ley es de los reynos de las Indias, and the second 
volume in Novisima Recopilacion  in 1 8 0 5 .4 6  These both explicitly 
stated that all title to land, water, and minerals were held by the 
crown unless it granted outright ownership or temporary right of 
use. The land and water grants to missions, presidios, and pueblos 
were usufructuary (temporary) in nature, meaning that the 
occupants held only the right to use the resources not to own them.
The volume of usable water varied according to individual and 
community needs, and according to available supply. The authority 
responsible for assuring fairness was the local cablido or town 
council, whose members were elected by the residents.47 The
44john W. Dwindle. The Colonial History: City of San Francisco. 4th ed.
(San Francisco, California: Towne & Bacon Publishing, 1867, text-fiche). This
book translates the material in the Plan of Pitic.
45ibid.
^^See  Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
47Michael Meyer and William L, Shelman, The Course of Mexican 
H istorv. 3d. ed., (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 157-158. 
also see Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43, 30-35.
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cablido  would adjudicate these resources as they believed proper. 
Their basic principle in allocating water was ‘proportionality’—people 
obtaining an amount to use in proportion to their legitimate needs 
and in proportion to the volume of water available. Of necessity, 
such a determination had to be made within the context of the needs 
of everyone in a community, and hence the amount of water
allocated to an individual was never fixed. Disputes could be
appealed to higher authorities, but the ultimate goal was to apportion
water fairly to each user, and to prevent conflict.^* If they failed in
their duties, the public would call for an election and the 
objectionable member(s) would be r e p l a c e d . ^ 9  Simply put, the 
community had local jurisdiction over locally shared water resources.
The traditional emphasis upon community carried with it 
recognition of a water right possessed by irrigation districts, towns, 
and other corporate municipalities. The rights often blurred the 
distinction between public and private for competing communities, 
since some private landholders had distinct claims to water 
resources. The only water to which a community, or anyone for that 
matter, could claim an exclusive right was that granted by the crown 
or that originating on the property itself.^0 Hence, water taken from 
springs and wells belonged solely to the owner of the land. The
4BSee Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35. The higher author!tes 
consisted of the governor who was appointed by the crown. Essentially the 
final decision lay with a government authority which indicated central 
c o n tro l.
^9Such was the case in Los Angeles on several occassions. The cablido 
had neglected their duties and many of them were summarily replaced after
the residents had been gathered for a vote. Records of the Los Angeles
Ayuntamiento, March 23, 1839, January 29, 1844, and June 16, 1838; taken from
Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35.
50Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
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private ground water rights they created could take precedence over 
those of larger communities as long as the resource was not being 
maliciously used.51 "Malicious use" meant preventing others from 
using the water if one did not choose to or causing damage to other 
peoples' property by irresponsible water use. However, there was no 
such thing as "over use." This Spanish legal principle was traceable 
to the Old World misunderstanding of the interrelationship between 
surface and ground water.
In disputes between an individual and a community or in a 
dispute involving different kinds of communities, the principle of 
“equity and justice,” as enunciated in the Plan of Pitic and other 
regulations, became the fundamental test of fairness. Yet, often, it 
was this clash of public interests that caused excrutiatingly difficult 
situations. For example, the pueblo of Branciforte and the mission at 
Santa Cruz, around present day San José, had competing claims to the 
waters of the San Lorenzo River. Two communities, each holding 
legitimate public interests, were in direct conflict. The mission 
claimed that it was the supreme Spanish settlement, while the 
pueblo considered itself supreme, maintaining that its water rights 
should be considered paramount. Each argued that secure water 
supplies helped pacify the surrounding Indian populations. The 
result was that the mission, the upstream user, diverted water which
^^This third party identification was of primary importance in the 
water law of colonial Spain. The only third parties consedered were other 
water users, rather than third parties associated with the benefits of the water 
consumption. For instance, a worker employeed for the landowner had no 
"right" to the water used on the land. For information regarding this issue see 
Curtis Wilgus, Colonial Hispanic America. 4th ed., (Washington, D C.: George
W ashington University Press, 1936), 184.
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finally led to the abandonment of the downstream p u e b l o . 5 2  Thus, as 
the population grew and use of water bodies diversified, social 
problems related to water consumption intensified. Each settlement 
change affected a change in the social norms of water use which, in 
turn, produced new issues that became central to the elaboration of 
law and public policy.
A Spanish community's responsibility for a water system 
extended to the quality, as well as the quantity, of supply. Multiple- 
use water was not only used for animals, laundry, and sewage, but 
for drinking water as well. Detailed local ordinances regulated use to 
prevent the pollution of surface-water destined for human 
consumption, but the opportunities for abuse by the careless or naïve 
were many. In Los Angeles, the cablido  was constantly battling to 
maintain the potability of the community’s drinking water by 
attempting to control those putting trash in, bathing or washing 
clothes in, laying drain pipes in, allowing their cattle in, or building 
cesspools too near the zanja madre, or main d i t c h . 53 The right to 
share water meant nothing if the supply was polluted. It was 
sharing between public uses that often created the problems.
Just like the Indians, the concept of the common good was also 
invariably ethnocentric when translated into action. Indian labor 
was absolutely necessary for the construction and maintenance of 
hydraulic works. Freedom for the Indians meant laboring for a 
foreign culture on behalf of God, country, and other men’s profits. In 
1836, shrinking labor supplies compelled the fledgling pueblo of Los
5 2Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43. 
53ibid., 30-35
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Angeles to force criminals into labor to build and repair irrigation 
ditches and c a n a l s . 54 Simultaneously, the cablido  increased the 
number of offenses and the length of prison terms, basically ensuring 
the availability of “slave” labor by California I n d i a n s . 5 5  The Spanish 
experience with California's water reflected the general Hispanic 
commitment to bien procumunal (the common good)-but only for 
the dominant culture.
Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821, and 
immediately tried to solidify its hold upon California by expanding 
private settlements. In 1848, at the end of the Mexican-American 
war, Mexico ceded California to the United States through the treaty 
of Guadalupe-Hildalgo. In this treaty, the United States agreed to 
honor all pre-existing titles to property.56 The combination of the 
private settlements and the powerful legal implications of the treaty 
have created an interesting twist to California's current water law 
and policy. First, the treaty must be obeyed; and second, the water 
rights which the treaty endorses are antecedent to all water rights 
even those of the federal government itself.57 The adoption of these 
laws was an unforeseen blunder.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and on into the 
twentieth, some California communities asserted a so-called “pueblo 
water right” based upon the legacy of Spanish water l a w . 58 Pueblos
5 4 H u n d l c y ,  The Great Thirst, supra note 35.
55lbid., 58-62.
56Joseph L. Sax, Robert H. Abrams, and Barton H Thompson, Jr., L egal 
Control of Water Resources. 2d ed., (Minneapolis, Minnesota: West Publishing
Company, 1991), 360f. Hereafter Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control. 
57ibid., 360.
58ibid., 361.
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possess a paramount right to the beneficial and reasonable use of all 
needed naturally-occurring surface and subsurface water from the 
entire watershed of any stream flowing through the pueblo. The 
quantity of water available for use under a pueblo right increases 
with population and with extensions of city limits by the annexation 
of land not within the original pueblo. Los Angeles has been the 
most aggressive and successful city in advancing such a claim, and 
has persuaded the California courts to award it exclusive right to the
Los Angeles River and the runoff of the entire 500-square-mile
watershed, and its associated groundwater reserves—a victory that 
helped assure Los Angeles’ emergence as the preeminent city of
California and the W e s t . 5 9  San Diego has also won formal judicial
recognition of a pueblo right. However, neither the principles of 
Spanish and Mexican water law nor the water disputes engaged in by 
these cities during the Spanish and Mexican periods seem to support 
the pueblo water-rights t h e o r y . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  the legacy of colonial 
Spain upon present-day water policy and law is pueblo water rights.
M iner's and Farm er's Settlem ent
After the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildalgo, 
Anglo-Europeans emigrated to California, bringing with them new
^^Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21, 55-7, 90-2, and 105-6.
GOLos Angeles has gained exclusive control of the Los Angeles River 
watershed through the judicial decree expounding Spanish and Mexican water 
law. But the decrees have ignored the primary focus of Spanish colonial water 
law. Spanish water law protected individuals water rights as much as 
community water rights. Moreover, surrounding communities had claims to 
the water under the principle of "equity and justice." For a court cases dealing
with this issue see City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975) or City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.,
209 Cal. 105, 287 Pac. 475 (1930).
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methods of resource allocation. The Hispanic experience with aridity 
and water-resource allocation, in both the Old and New World, 
produced public policy stressing community rights and strong 
centralized government. The newcomers came from relatively 
humid landsGi and traditions that valued individual rights and 
minimal governmental i n t e r f e r e n c e . 2̂ The era of central control of 
water resources was essentially dead,^^ replaced by a system of 
individual water rights, embodied in the Common Law of England. 
English Common Law reflected the settlers’ past experiences with 
geography, water resources, and socio-economics. Unfortunately, 
contrary to the Spanish experience, neither the geography nor the 
resource economics of California related well to the experience of the 
Anglo-European immigrants. As a result, the laws governing the 
people and resources were often ill-suited to the needs of the settlers 
and they were forced to hastily develop new laws in order to satisfy 
their needs.
^ im m ig ran ts came from England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Ireland, as well as from Oregon and the east coast of the United States; lands 
where water resources were abundant and could be used without personal 
restraint. See  Ellen Churchill Semple, American Historv and Its Geographic 
C onditions (Cambridge, England: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903), 215-19.
Hereafter, Semple, American H istory.
^^Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 65. Many individuals fled to 
the United States to avoid overbearing governments which maintained control 
over natural resources. People emigrated so that they, as individuals, could 
decide their own fate.
Although the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildalgo preserved private water 
rights and, later, some public water rights founded under Mexican and 
Spanish water law, the complete power of the central authority was gone. No 
longer could the calb ido  decide to whom and for what purposes water should be 
allocated. Instead, private individuals used the waters as they saw fit.
G^The Common Law of England was adopted by the early United States 
settlers and was therefore, considered the guiding principle of the United 
States territories. The Common Law contained many references to both public 
and private rights which will be discussed later in this paper. See generally, 
Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56.
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The riparian doctrine was the original water law brought to 
California by the northern E u r o p e a n s . The fundamental principle 
of riparianism was that the owner of the land bordering a body of 
water acquired certain rights to the use of the water. Distinctions 
were made between moving bodies of water, termed riparian, and 
stagnant bodies of water, labelled littoral. In general, the operative 
rules were identical. First, each landowner bordering upon a body of 
water could make reasonable use of the water associated with that 
parcel of land if the use did not disturb the reasonable uses of other 
riparians. Second, the riparian land owner would maintain the water 
right irrespective of whether the water right was e x e r c i s e d . ^ 6  The 
two key issues for riparianism were defining which lands were 
actually riparian, so that they were entitled to riparian water rights, 
and assessing what was considered a reasonable u s e . ^ 7  Today, 
California's riparian waters can be used, allowing some dimunition of 
quantity and quality, so long as the challenged use is reasonable 
within the totality of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^ 8  One carries a riparian 
water right, but that right is subject to all of the concerns and 
demands of all parties remaining in the system. Therefore, under 
this policy, water has a community value in addition to its 
commodity value,
^^David H. Getches, Water Law. 2d. ed., (St. Paul Minnesota: West
Publishing Co., 1990), 14-46. Hereafter, Getches, Water Law.
6 6 ib id .
^^Ibid. See also Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 
56, 37-65.
GSibid.
G^The idea of protecting “third-party interests’* is reemerging as the 
preeminant issue in water-resource allocation and will be covered in detail in 
later chapters o f this paper.
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The early California settlers used riparian water law because 
they were familiar with its tenets and it was applicable to their 
predominant land uses. Following the Spanish example, ranchers 
raised cattle along the seemingly endless riparian grasslands of the 
coastal regions and the Central Valley. Successful cattle ranching 
required a steady supply of pasture and a dependable source of 
water. Huge tracts of grassland were monopolized along lakes and 
streams, securing extensive water rights as written in the English 
Common Law. The usufruct water rights gave ranchers unimpeded 
liberty to use the water as long as they maintained the “natural flow’ 
of the rivers.70 Thus, the riparian doctrine simulated Indian and 
Spanish water law in its concern for community equity, yet the right 
was not truly held and administered by the community. Instead, it 
obliged each riparian land holder to preserve the water resource for 
the good of the public.71 In reality, the sparse settlements and vast 
land holdings allowed ranchers to degrade water without injuring 
other human parties. Water was not considered a scarce resource, 
and the mechanisms of degradation were not u n d e r s t o o d . 7  2  
Unfortunately, this ignorance, combined with the gold rush and the
70Natural flow meaning that they did not impede the quantity or quality 
of the flow. In reality, nobody new what the natural flow was. For more 
information on natural flow see generally Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, L e g al 
C o n tro l, supra note 56, 37-134.
71 This natural flow was later interpreted to mean maintaining
navigability of the river. Navigation is one of the primary issues in 
controversies between public and private rights and will be discussed in detail
later in the paper.
72[)onald Worster, Rivers of Empire: .Water Aridity and the Growth of
the American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 22-29. Hereafter,
Worster, R ivers.
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subsequent population growth, eliminated the functional successes of 
the riparian system of water rights.
The discovery of gold in 1848 at Sutter’s Mill ignited a chain of 
events that changed California’s water law forever. For the first time 
in California’s history, the gold-seeking placer miners started a new 
demographic trend: they settled away from natural water
s u p p l i e s . 73 Water resources were located in areas where the miners 
could not use them for the purposes that they wanted and, hence, 
riparian water rights had to be rejected. For one thing, the miners 
did not own the majority of land that they mined. The public land 
had been ceded by Mexico to the United States government after the 
Mexican-American war. Since the miner’s were essentially 
trespassers on the public lands, riparian rights would not have 
benefitted them because they would not have had any legal right to
the water that they were using. Second, the places in which the
miners needed to use water were not riparian lands and were often 
located quite a distance away from sources of water. Miners were 
forced to adjust to the environment and manipulate its resources as
best they could for the social and economic purposes they and
society desired.
Since California was not a state in 1849, there was no local 
government to enforce the rules of English Common Law.74 
Nevertheless, the miner’s needed some form of administrative forum 
to protect their interests as mining techniques evolved from simple
73Douglas R. Littlefield, “Water Rights during the California Gold Rush: 
Conflicts over Economic Points of View,” The Western Historical Quarterly 14 
(October 1983): 415. Hereafter Littlefield, "Water Rights."
74ibid.
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river panning to complex hydraulic works. The Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriation emerged as the governing rule of both mining and 
water r i g h t s . 7 5  Water adjudication replicated the system of the 
public domain in mining rights in that it required the newcomers to 
post notices of their water claims and record them with the district 
clerks; it settled disputes with reference to priority claim; and it 
subjected water rights to loss by waste or n o n - u s e . 7 6  The “posted 
notices” required miners to list the amount of water claimed; the 
means of diversion, the date of the claim, and the place of use; the 
purpose of use; and the name of the right holder. Furthermore, 
implicit in the miners' adoption of prior appropriation was the fact 
that they separated water rights from land rights, allowing transfers 
of water over great distances. Prior appropriation was a mining law 
created and upheld by miners to protect their interests, as they 
helped themselves to the land, gold, and water under rules and 
regulations of their own m a k i n g . 7 7
Given the importance of mining to the state, many Californians, 
especially miners, assumed that appropriative water rights were 
synonymous with mining rights, just as riparian rights were 
associated with riparian lands and agriculture. As Douglas Littlefield 
stated, “While the phrase ‘by priority’ suggests that the miners were 
claiming prior appropriation, the rest of the petition indicates that 
they felt entitled to water by virtue of their occupation—with ‘by
75ibid., see also, Worster, R ivers, supra note 72, 89-99.
76Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 59-72.
77William E. Colby, “The Freedom of the Miner and its influence on 
Water Law," Legal Essays. (1935): 67-84 taken from Littlefield, "Water Rights,"
supra note 73.
3 6
priority’ meaning ‘first in right’ because they were miners, and not 
necessarily 'first in time.'”78 Yet, there were those who openly 
dissented. First, the corporate hydraulic mines, which required 
tremendous amounts of water for their operations, eventually 
monopolized water rights on smaller streams to the detriment of the 
small mining claims. Second, water companies acquired numerous 
water rights and sold them to miners in an open market for a profit. 
Miners threatened and boycotted water financiers, even destroying 
many dams and flumes while water-company officials responded by 
lobbying California’s Legislature to formally recognize their interests. 
Both sides took disputes to court and attempted to make the legal 
process conform to their point of view. Eventually, the courts 
decided that water rights were separate and distinct from mining 
rights and, in 1872, twenty-two years after California was granted 
statehood, the Legislature gave prior appropriation statutory
recognition.79
Obviously, there were sharp differences between the values 
and needs of California's previous occupants and those of the miners 
of 1849. As Norris Hundley commented, the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriation “resembled Hispanic water law in its emphasis on use 
as the decisive consideration for developing a region; but unlike the 
Hispanic practices, it grounded water rights on personal initiative.
78Littlefield, "Water Rights," supra note 73, 423.
7*The major cases that led to the official adoption of prior appropriation 
were: Eddy v. Simpson 3 Cal. 249 (1853); Irwin v. Phillips 5 Cal. 140 (1855); 
Hoffman v. Stone 7 Cal. 46 (1857). The statute that fostered prior appropriation 
was soon eliminated from the California Water Code, but the legacy of these 
cases is that they forced the legislature to acknowledged the doctrine's 
acceptance in the California .
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not on an imperial decree or administrative o r d e r . ” ^ 0  The doctrine 
had three fundamental axioms; First, it separated water rights from 
land rights. Second, it allowed interbasin transfers. Finally, it 
required water to be put to a beneficial use.^i In water adjudication 
disputes, priority, rather than equity or justice, was the main 
concern, and public interests were rarely, if ever, considered. The 
system reflected distaste for activist government, preference for 
local decision-making, and emphasis upon individual enterprise.
To complicate matters, California’s population was growing 
rapidly while awareness of limited water resources was spreading.
In 1850, California's population stood at 100,000; by 1852 it had 
increased to over 200,000.^2 Each year, from 1852 to 1900, the 
population increase was from a minimum of 18,000 to a maximum of 
35,000 people.83 The first settlers were overflow settlers from 
O regon,84 and the second set were drawn to California by gold. But 
the next generation came to take advantage of economic 
opportunities in the rapidly expanding cities or for the opportunity 
to obtain land.85 In fact, by 1870, the basis of Northern California 
settlement had shifted from mining to agriculture.86 As long as 
settlement was sparse, non-miners did not share the miners’ 
concerns over water allocation—the pattern of isolated communities
8^^Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 72.
81 Getches, Water Law, supra note 65, 82-5.
82Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note 11,65. See also Kahrl,
California Water Atlas, supra note 5.
83lbid.
84semple, American History, supra note 61, 215-19.
85Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note 11,70. Also see Kahrl,
California Water Atlas, supra note 5.
86lbid., 66.
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upon bodies of water, separated by vast tracts of arid and semi-arid 
lands, changed as immigrant farmers filled in the gaps. Settlement 
increased while available riparian lands decreased. Moreover, 
completion of the transcontinental railway, the invention of the 
refrigerator car, the development of commercial grain farming, and 
the production of highly valued fruit crops reaffirmed the value of 
limited water resources and heightened the demand for interbasin 
transfers and the elimination of riparianism.
Water’s role in society came into question as the geographical 
patterns of settlement and the cultural needs of Californians changed. 
Agricultural and urban settlements were rapidly growing in areas far 
removed from natural surface-water r e s o u r c e s . E x p l o s i v e  urban 
population increase and concerns about steady water supplies ignited 
heated debates throughout the state upon how to supply and 
augment water resources. Appropriators opposed r i p a r i a n s ,
Kahrl, California Water Atlas, supra note 5, 14.
settlements were diverting water out of watersheds in direct 
conflict with the riparian principle of natural flow. Prior appropriation and
riparianism were simply incomparable. The first significant case pitting 
riparian against appropriator was the Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 1857, which 
held that the non-mining riparian property holder was entitled to riparian 
water rights. For brief see A. Dan Tar lock, James N. Corbridge, Jr., and David H. 
Getches. Water Resource Management A Casebook in Law and Public Policv.
4th ed., (Westbury, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1993), 158. Hereafter
Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater Resource M anagement. Later, in the
famous Lux v. Haggin dispute of 1866, the California Supreme Court affirmed 
the legal preeminence of riparian rights. Riparian rights were soon subject 
to priority as established by the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. Another 
major definition of the relationship between riparian and appropriative
rights occurred in 1928 in the case Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison
Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926). The fallout from this case led to the adoption
of Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution in 1928, which states that
all waters o f the state must be used “reasonably and beneficially.” This 
standard requires that all water resources must be put to beneficial use to the 
fullest extent of which they are capable, and waste or unreasonable use or 
unreasonable method of use of water must be prevented. One court stated that 
“whether a use is reasonable' or not depends upon all the facts and
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preservationists denounced d e v e l o p e r s , 8 9  and public interests 
challenged private water r i g h t s . I t  was the beginning of a new era 
in California’s hydrogeography, characterized by competition among 
multiple private and public interests in water resources.
The cultural interpretation of water resources by all of 
California’s past inhabitants were as diverse as its physical 
environment. The one common thread, however, was the need for a 
steady supply of fresh water for every individual. Native Americans 
recognized the importance of preserving nature in order to sustain 
their livelihood and would fiercely protect their resources from 
outside influences for the benefit of their small communities.
circumstances of a particular case and can, and will, change over time to best 
meet the needs of the public." For an overview of the Herminhaus case see 
Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 353-354.
8^In order to deter conflict, many developers believed that the water
problems could be overcome by increasing supplies, transferring water from 
places of plenty to place of deficit. There are several topics worth 
investigating in this era of water-resource development. The development of 
Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles in 1913, the construction of Hetch 
Hetchy in the Sierra Nevadas for San Francisco's municipal supply (against 
the strong objections of John Muir and the Sierra Club), the development of 
the Colorado River, and construction of the State Water Project and the Central 
Valley Project. All of these were hotly contested by a variety of pubiic- 
interest groups, including preservationists, conservationists, and developers. 
Many of the same issues that were contested then have been revived and are 
currently being debated. For a good overview of the issues see Kahrl,
California Water A tlas, supra note 5.
^^Since the earliest settlements in California, competing public 
interests and competing private interests have been a major source of 
controversy. Native Californians fought to preserve the water in their
territories. The Spanish had public interest conflicts among presidios, 
missions, and pueblos. The Anglo-Californians have had to preserve water 
resources first for navigation, then for recreation, and now for 
environmental and aesthetic concerns. It is important to remember that 
public interests are often in direct conflict with private rights. In an early 
attempt at a more orderly method of authorizing use of unappropriated waters, 
the California Legislature approved the Water Commission Act of 1913 
establishing a perm it process to control surface water appropriations hoping 
to derail some of the public-interest problems. The Act created a state agency 
(now the State Water Resources Control Board) and authorized it to administer 
the perm it process.
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Although the Spanish were aware of some of the state's hydrological 
variability, they chose to ignore environmental preservationism, 
focusing their concerns upon "consumptive use." Benefit could only 
be gained if water resources were used by individuals for productive 
community purposes, such as farming and ranching. Finally, the 
Forty-Niners removed community responsibility from the individual 
by separating land and water rights. This mining philosophy allowed 
water to be transported out of natural channels, over great distances, 
for any personal use. The legacy of these three cultures have been 
the focus of controversy in California's water policy and law for the 
last 100 years.
Today, the more than thirty million people that currently 
inhabit California^i consume, on average, over forty billion gallons of 
water every d a y . 9 2  The majority of the population has settled in 
large urban areas that are either located far away from usable water 
sources or have maximized the development of their surrounding 
water supplies. In fact, seventy percent of California's natural 
surface-water supplies lie north of the latitude of Sacramento, while 
eighty percent of the state's population, along with most of its 
irrigated agriculture and industry, lies south of that latitude^) (fig. 6) 
Thus, the focus has been upon augmenting supply through water 
transfers by moving water from places of surplus to places of deficit.
Californians have built 1251 major reservoirs (table 2) and 
millions of smaller canals and ditches to redistribute water
91 Hart. California Water Plan Update. Vol. I. supra note 10, 145ff.
92United States Geological Survey, "Estimated Use of Water in the United 
States in 1985 (1988).
93Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 1-12
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Figure 6.
AVERAGE ANNUAL 
W ATER SURPLUS
Less than 8 in. (20cm) 
8-24 in. (20-60cm)
24-40 in.
More than 40 in. 
(100cm )
(60-100cm)
Table 2. Major Surface Water Reservoirs in California
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R e se r v o ir
N a m e
H y d r o l o g i e
R e g i o n
C a p a c i ty
lOOO's of AF
O w n e r
C lear Lake NC 527 USBR
T a h o e ML 732 USBR
C lear Lake SR 313 YCFCWCD
H etch H etchy SF 360 SF
Shaver Lake SJ 135 SCE
A lm a n o r SR 1308 P G & E
B ucks SR 106 P G & E
P a rd e e SJ 210 EBMUD
Salt Springs SJ 139 P G & E
El C apitan SC 113 SD
H a v a su CD 619 USBR
M a tth e w s SC 179 MW D
C ro w ley SL 183 LADWP
P ra d o SC 201 USCE
S h a s ta SR 4552 USBR
M ille r to n SJ 520 USBR
Isa b e lla TL 568 USCE
C a c h u m a CC 205 USBR
E d iso n SJ 125 SCE
Pine Flat TL 1000 USCE
F o lso m SR 974 USBR
L lo y d SJ 268 SF
N a c im in to CC 340 MCWA
B e rry e ssa SR 1600 USBR
T w itc h e ll CC 240 USBR
W ish o n TL 128 P G & E
C o u r t r ig h t TL 123 P G & E
C a sita s SC 254 USBR
Lake M endocino NC 122 USCE
M am m oth Pool SJ 122 SCE
C lair Eagle NC 2448 USBR
K aw eah TL 143 USCE
Black Butte SR 144 USCE
Cam p Far W est SR 104 SSWD
U nion V alley SR 271 SMUD
C a m a n c h e SJ 417 EBMUD
W h is k e y to w n SR 241 USBR
New Hogan SJ 317 USCE
San A ntonio CC 330 MCWA
F rench  M eadow s SR 136 PCWA
Hell H ole SR 208 PCWA
Table 2. continued
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R e se r v o ir H y d r o l o g i e C a p a c i ty O w n e r
N a m e R e g i o n lOOO's of AF
New E xchquer SJ 1025 MID
San Luis SJ 2039 USBR
O ro v ille SR 3538 DW U
New B ullards B ar SR 966 YCWA
S ta m p e d e NL 226 USBR
New D on Pedro SJ 2030 TID-M ID
C asta ic SC 324 DW R
P y ra m id SC 171 DW R
P e rr is SC 131 DW R
B u c h a n a n SJ 150 USCE
Indian  V alley SR 300 YCFCWCD
New M elones SJ 2420 USBR
Lake Sonom a NC 381 USCE
New  Spicer
M ead o w s SJ 190 CCWD
Reservoir owners listed
CCWD:
DWR:
EBMUD:
LADWP:
MCWA:
MID:
MWD:
PCWA:
PG&E:
SCE:
SD::
SF:
SMUD:
SSWD:
TID-MID:
USCE:
USBR:
YCFCWCD:
YCWA:
Calaveras County Water District
California Department of Water Resources
East Bay Municipal Utilities District
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
Monterey County Water Agency
Merced Irrigation District
Metropolitan Water District
Placer County Water Agency
Pacific Gas and Electric
Southern California Edison Company
City of San Diego
City of San Francisco
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
South Sutter Water District
Turlock Irrigation Dist. and Modesto Irrigation Dist. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conserv. Dist. 
Yuba County Water Agency
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throughout the s t a t e . ^ 4  Today, only the Eel, Mad, Mattole, Smith, and 
part of the Klamath River in the northwest corner of the state remain 
essentially in their pre-European condition (fig. 7). Federal and state 
authorities transport water to nearly every corner of the state 
through a complex system of pumps, siphons, reservoirs, and canals. 
The federal Central Valley Project (GYP), which began deliveries in 
1951, moves water from regions north of the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta to the southern end of the San Joaquin Valley. In 
1959, Californians appropriated funds for the State Water Project 
(SWP) which now transports water south through the San Joaquin 
Valley, up 3000 feet over the Tehachapi Mountain Range, and into 
the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area.^5 The modifications of 
the natural environment and the accompanying infrastructure are 
monumental in size and scope, covering over five-hundred miles of 
land and redistributing over thirty-five MAP of water every year.^^ 
Nevertheless, the supply is apparently not enough, as the urban, 
industrial, agricultural, and environmental interests bitterly compete 
for California’s water resources.
By far, agriculture uses the majority of California’s developed 
surface- and ground water resources, totalling over forty-nine MAP 
of water per year; thirty-seven MAP of surface water and twelve 
MAP of ground water.^^ On the other hand, urban and 
environmental interests require an additional eight MAP of water
^^Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21, 9 
^^Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note 11,78.
^^Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 6. 
97ibid. at 48, 75. and 86.
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Figure 7.
MAJOR WATER PROJECTS
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per y e a r . A d d i n g  to the scarcity concerns is the fact that 
California’s population is rapidly expanding and is expected to reach 
fifty million people by the year 2 0 2 0 ^̂  (table 3). If current 
consumption rates are maintained, urban and environmental 
demands are expected to increase by 6.5 MAF to at least 14.5 MAF, 
representing an eighty-two percent increase in demand for fresh, 
usable water.^00 Satisfying this demand would require the 
agriculture industry to reduce its consumption by a scant thirteen 
percent, freeing the water for redistribution. From an economic 
standpoint, water is not becoming increasingly scarce; cheap water is. 
Therefore, one can assert that the p e rc e ived  scarcity of water is a 
direct result of poor water-resource m a n a g e m e n t . ! o i
^^Ibid. at 48, 75, and 86. Minimum stream flows are exempted from this 
calculation because the SWRC6 in conjunction with the state Legislature has 
exempted a certain portion of "instream flows" from adjudication. Thus, these 
minimum flows are a substantial portion of the annual runoff.
^^Tim Palmer, "A Great Number of People," Californians Threatened
Environment Restoring the Dream (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993), 22.
See also David W. Lantis, Rodney Steiner, and Arthur E. Karinen, C alifo rn ia :
The Pacific Connection (Chico, California: Creekside Press, 1989), 6-8, 536-43.
!^®Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 11.
! (! ! Three primary agencies oversee California 's water allocation system. 
They are the United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Water 
Resources, and the State Water Resources Control Board. According to the 
Coordinated Operation Agreement (CCA) of 1986, these three agencies are 
responsible for co-managing California's complex water system. The 
diversification of public and private interests combined with the complexity of 
the administration and the magnitude of the water transfers has created a 
bureaucratic  water nightm are.
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Table 3.
Urban Population by Hydrologie Region (in millions)
H y d r o lo g ie
R e g io n 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0
North Coast 0 . 6 0 . 7 0 . 8 1.3
San Francisco 5 . 5 6 . 2 6 . 6 7
Central Coast 1 . 3 1 . 5 1 . 8 2 . 2
South Coast 1 6 . 2 1 9 . 3 2 2 . 1 25.5
Sacramento River 2 . 2 2 . 9 3.5 5.1
San Joaquin River 1 . 4 2 2 . 6 3.3
Tulare Lake 1 . 6 2 . 2 2 . 8 3.5
North Lahontan 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1
South Lahontan 0 . 6 1 1.4 2
Colorado River 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 1
3 0 3 6 . 5 42.5 51.1
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CHAPTER 4 
WATER TRANSFERS 
When affordable water becomes scarce, conflicts over access 
begin to develop and new water allocation processes must evolve. 
Water is said to be scarce when there is no longer enough available 
to allow all public and private interests to have as much as they 
want without giving up something else of value in order to obtain it. 
Consequently, some allocative decisions must be made regarding who 
will have access to water resources, and under what conditions. ^0 2  
In California, water scarcity has resulted from a growth in industrial, 
urban, and environmental demands, coupled with an insufficient 
supply of free-flowing unappropriated waters. 1̂ 3 The expansion of 
environmentalism, for instance, has not only prevented new water- 
storage facilities from being developed, but simultaneously imposed 
substantial demands upon previously allocated s u p p l i e s . I n  1993,
1 0 2 Bonnie G. Colby, Mark A. McGinnis, and Ken A. Rait, “Mitigating 
Environm ental Externalities through Voluntary and Involuntary W ater 
Reallocation; Nevada’s Truckee-Carson River Basin,” Natural Resources 
Journal 31 (Fall 1991): 760. Hereafter Colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating
E nvironm ental E x ternalities."
^OSgonnie Colby Saliba and David B. Bush, Water Markets in Theorv and 
P ractice  (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 4-7. Hereafter, Saliba,
W ater M arkets.
104por example, when the federal government listed the fall-run 
Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt as endangered species, more water had to 
be allocated from both the federal and state water projects to support these 
ailing populations. Moreover, many of the normal management functions of 
the major water projects such as timing of releases had to be altered which 
further reduced supplies to areas south of the delta during certain times of 
y e a r .
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these realizations led Governor Pete Wilson to endorse this statement 
issued by the Department of Water Resources:
C alifornia’s population continues to grow, while dependable 
water supplies diminish... Prospects for developing any 
substantial additional water supply through traditional means 
(such as new reservoirs) are slim at best. In this stressful 
climate, increasing attention and hopes are focusing on water 
tra n s fe rs .  ̂® ^
Thus, if  growing industrial, urban, and envrionmental demands are 
to be met, either voluntary or involuntary transfers of water among 
competing uses will be necessary.
Water transfers have been commonplace since the earliest 
settlement of California. Indians, colonialists, and miners all 
transferred water by diverting or changing the type of water use 
associated with their basic needs. Agriculturalists transferred water 
through diversion ditches to irrigate crops and provide pasture for 
cattle, while gold seekers moved water over great distances for 
hydraulic mining. One court even stated that “the right to 
appropriate water predates recorded h i s t o r y . ” 0̂ 7  Although there are 
many similarities between California’s ancient and contemporary 
appropriators, the principal difference between the Anglo-European’s 
transfers and the Spanish and Indian transfers was that the latter
lOSDepariment of Water Resources of California, “Water Transfers in 
California: Translating Concept into Reality,” (November 1993), 7. Hereafter
Department of Water Resources, "Water Transfers." David Kennedy (Director 
of DWR) and Douglas P. Wheeler (Secretary of Resources) also endorsed the 
b ook le t.
106George A. Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," Natural Resources 
Tournai 2 9 , (1 9 8 9 ):  4 5 8 . Hereafter Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights."
107ciough V. Wing 2 Ariz. 3 71 , 3 80 , 17 P. 4 5 3 , 4 5 5  (1 8 8 8 )
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generally limited their transfers to other similar users within a single 
watershed.
From the inception of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, a 
water right has been a transferable property interest.!09 During the 
Gold Rush, for example, when a miner wanted to transfer a water 
right, he or she altered the diversion and then reported the changes 
to the county courthouse. If no other miner could prove injury, then 
the water transfer remained intact. Several legislative and judicial 
decisions treated a water right granted under prior appropriation as 
a property interest independent of land and, therefore, as 
independently transferable.!!0 jn fact, providing water to others 
was itself considered to be a beneficial use, and thus a legitimate 
profit-making enterprise. Profits from individual and cooperative 
ditches mainly came from gold, and secondly from selling excess 
water to other miners.! ü  Larger transfer efforts reversed this order, 
with profits derived primarily from selling water to m iners.!!2 
Nevertheless, all of these uses and transfers were protected by the 
Doctrine of Prior Appropriation.
After the Gold Rush, as Californians rapidly settled the coast 
and interior valleys, water transfers grew in both scope and scale.
!^®A. Dan Tarlock, “New Water Transfer Restrictions: The West Returns
to Riparianism,” W ater Resources Research 27 (June 1991): 990. Hereafter
Tarlock "New W ater Transfer Restrictions." These transfers usually occurred 
with a change in goals of the group. For example, the water from the streams 
or lakes served multiple interests. Depending on the time of year or the 
importance of certain interests, water was transferred to accomodate those 
in te re s ts .
!09Getches, Water Law, supra note 65, 82-5.
llOMaeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261, 261 (1857); McDonald v. Bear River Co., 
13 Cal. 220, 232 (1859).
! ! ! Littlefield, "Water Rights," supra note 73, 421.
!12jbid.
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San Francisco and Los Angeles transferred water from hundreds of 
miles away to quench their growing t h i r s t s , w h i l e  the farmers of 
the Central Valley developed land and erected diversion ditches to 
provide pasture for cattle and irrigate crops. Historically, one of the 
most famous examples of a water transfer was the purchase of tens 
of thousands of acres of agricultural land and its associated water 
rights in the Owens River Valley by the City of Los Angeles shortly 
after the turn of the c e n t u r y . T h e  ensuing devastation of the 
valley and the later extension of the project into the Mono Basin 
evoked strong reactions from C a l i f o r n i a n s . 1
Later, in 1933, responding to increased agricultural demands 
for water, the voters of California authorized the Central Valley 
Project, which, after construction, was the largest federally funded 
water-transfer project in the United S t a t e s . U p o n  its completion 
in 1958, the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) offered 
approximately 7.5 MAF per year of water-rights permits to the
llS S ee  generally, Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to 
Agribusiness. The Irrigation Crusade in California and the W est (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). Hereafter, Pisani, Family Farm . See also 
Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21, 54-57, 62-107, and 344-47.
^Harrison C. Dunning, "Dam Fights and Water Policy in California:
1 Q<SQ-1 Q8Q." Journal of the West 29 (July 1990): 25. Hereafter, Dunning, "Dam
F igh ts ."
1 l5Sce Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21. See Hundley, The Great 
T h irs t, supra note 35.
ll^ T h e  Central Valley Project was voted upon by Californians in 1933. 
Since the nation was soon in a deep depression, the state could not pay for the 
development of the project. Franklin Delano Roosevelt stepped in with the 
“New Deal” and funded the project, making it an exclusively federal water 
project managed by the Bureau of Reclamation. Recently, the lack of control 
by the state of California over the Central Valley Project has caused 
considerable tension between the Department of Water Resources and the 
Bureau of Reclamation, especially since new federal environmental 
regulations have been enacted. In 1990, in an effort to simplify the water 
management system. Governor Wilson attempted to have the federal 
government relinquish control of the project, but his efforts failed.
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United States Bureau of Reclamation, which then divided the water 
among various irrigation districts in the Central Valley.11*7 These 
rights allowed the federal government to move substantial quantities 
of water over four-hundred miles from northern to central California 
solely for the benefit of agricultural development.^ One can see 
that water transfers have had a long history in both the private and 
public sectors of California's society.
Despite the foregoing examples, historically there have been a 
number of impediments to the free transfer of water rights. For one 
thing, the California Supreme Court has always held that the transfer 
of a water right could not result in injury to other (junior) 
appropriators. 1 This holding has not only made the initial use of 
water the measure of the right which could be transferred, but has 
also protected all appropriative-rights holders from irresponsible 
water users. Thus, transfers which would increase consumption, 
decrease return flows, or in any way change the availability of water 
to junior appropriators were prohibited or were designed to 
eliminate these effects. 120  Likewise, on the larger scale, the 
legislature enacted statutes designed to protect “areas of origin” from
Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 6.
1 Agricultural development was seen by many members of the federal 
government as the way to halt the depression. By the time the project was 
completed, the depression was over and California had become one of the 
primary economic and social centers in the United States. The rapid urban and 
industrial development of southern California would prove to be the next great 
hurdle in the water allocation game.
ll^K idd  V, Laird, 15 Cal. 162, 181 (1860). A junior appropriator has less 
seniority than a senior appropriator. Each water right is based on priority. 
However, some junior water rights are directly affected by senior water use. 
Thus, even though the water is privately used, the water user often holds a 
public obligation to continue to use his water in the same manner as he always 
has. This topic will be covered in detail later in the paper.
120GouId, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 459-460.
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economic collapse and environmental degradation resulting from 
water transfers. 121 Such prohibitions still protect the rights of junior 
appropriators and the resources of water-supply areas.
The Prior Appropriation Doctrine evolved in response to 
economic scarcity, as water users realized that an allocative process 
was needed to settle conflicts and facilitate the orderly use of water 
resources. 122  The contemporary motives for water reallocation 
through water transfers hardly differ from those of the earliest 
Californians: the people and the government want water to be used
for its most beneficial purposes. Unfortunately, disagreements 
abound among individuals and public interest groups as to what a 
beneficial use is. Since cultural homogeneity no longer exists in 
California, and abusive water uses cannot be tolerated, maximizing 
water-use efficiency is a preeminant objective of California’s citizens 
and government. Therefore, the question is: what institutions or
processes of decision-making will lead to equitable water allocations 
and so should be favored, as opposed to procedures or practices that 
could lead to inequitable allocations?^ 23
As noted above, 124 Charles Howe has outlined five 
characteristics desirable in water-allocation processes: flexibility,
secure expectations, opportunity costs, predictability, and fairness. 
Water transfers require changes in places of use or types of use of
121 California Water Code § 1245 (West Supplement 1995).
122colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating Environmental Externalities," 
supra note 102, 760.
123Jack Hirshleifer, James C. DeHaven, and Jerome W. Milliman, W ater 
Supply: Economics. Technology, and Policy (1960): 36-42. Hereafter,
Hirshleifer, et. al., WatCt Supply.
124howc, et. al, "Innovative Approaches," supra note 4, 438-45.
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water rights. These reallocations can be accomplished in two ways: 
through involuntary measures, such as forced redistribution of 
certain quantities of water by judicial or legislative decree; or 
through voluntary measures, such as the free-trade of existing water 
r i g h t s .  1 2 5  In either case, the dual nature of water as a common- 
property resource intertwined with private property rights make it 
not only a necessary prerequisite for the development and 
maintenance of the economy and social structure which make a 
society possible, but a commodity to be bought, sold, and m o v e d .  1 2 6  
Any contemporary reallocations resulting from water transfers must 
consider both public and private interests.
125Tarlock "New Water Transfer Restrictions," supra note 108, 987.
126Victor Brajer and Wade E. Martin, “Water Rights Markets Social and 
Legal Considerations: Resource's ‘Community’ Value, Legal Inconsistencies
and Vague Definition and Assignment of Rights Color Issues,” A m erican  
Journal o f Economics _ and Sociology 49 (January 1990).
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The Public Trust Doctrine has emerged as the principal agent of 
involuntary water transfers in California. The doctrine declares that 
the state, as sovereign, took title to tidelands and the beds of non- 
tidal navigable water at the time that it was admitted to the union, 
holding trust over certain resources associated with these lands, 
which are the property of a l l .  1 2 7  it i s  the state's duty to exercise 
continued supervision over these lands and the water above them 
for the benefit of the p e o p l e .  128 Entities acquiring exclusive private 
rights in navigable streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands, 
generally hold those rights in conflict with the public trust, since 
they permit only limited access to the resource. Conversely, the 
Public Trust Doctrine does not limit public access to any resources
127Who exactly “air* is meant to represent is extremely controversial.
To some people, the "public" is considered to be only those who live in 
California. However, others would argue that the public is bounded by 
nationality, while still others would say that the public includes all human 
beings on the planet. Identifying the “public” in the Public Trust Doctrine 
could have profound impacts upon the outcome of public trust decisions.
128por the original insight into the contemporary Public Trust Doctrine 
see Joseph L. Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention,” Michigan Law Review 68 (Jan. 1970): 471- 
566. Hereafter, Sax, "Effective Judicial Intervention." For an opposing view 
see James L. Huffman, “Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on
the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and 
Johnson,” Denver Universitv Law Review 63 (1986): 565-584. Hereafter
Huffman "Trusting the Public Interest."
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deemed within its bounds. In other words, public or private rights 
acquired in public-trust resources cannot be placed entirely beyond 
the direction and control of the public at large.
In discussions of water reallocation, the Public Trust Doctrine 
gives the public the authority, through the courts, to reclaim water 
resources previously granted as public or private usufruct water 
rights. Usufruct water rights mean that since the property right is 
vested in another, a person or entity has the right of enjoying the 
profit, utility, and advantage that the use of the water may 
p r o d u c e .  129 in California, all water rights are vested in either the 
state government, the federal government, or the Native 
A m e r i c a n s .  1 3 0  These state and federal authorities retain the power 
to revoke usufruct water rights from water users for any reason, at 
any time, and without compensation. Therefore, a private usufruct 
right is secure as long as it does not infringe upon the public 
interests. If it does oppose these interests, then the Public Trust 
Doctrine authorizes non-compensatory water readjudication, even if 
the action injures the private party. This is called “involuntary 
reallocation.”
129Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary. 5th ed., (St. Paul, 
Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1983), 802. Hereafter, Black, L aw
Dictionarjÿi.
130xative American rights have been generally treated as states when 
water resource issues have gone to court. For an overview of Indian Reserved 
Water Rights see Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56; 
Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater Resource M anagement, supra note 85; 
or Getches, W ater Law, supra note 65. Other private water rights founded prior 
to statehood, such as Pueblo Water Rights are also exempt from state or federal 
control. The incidences of such rights have been nearly eliminated. Los 
Angeles and San Diego for example still hold pueblo rights but they are 
substantially watered down.
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Doctrine Evolution
The California Public Trust Doctrine derives its authority from 
Roman and English law. 131 Although public trust practices have been 
common to many cultures throughout world history, including 
American Indian, Chinese, Nigerian, Spanish, French, and Islamic 
communities, the Romans were the first to articulate the public trust 
in w r i t i n g .  1 3 2  j n  a.D . 528, the Roman Emperor Justinian, in the 
Institutes o f Justinian, designated navigable waterways as public 
resources for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing. The 
Emperor did not reserve water resources for aesthetic, 
environmental, or spiritual purposes, but rather for economic 
endeavors and resource consumption. 133 it is logical to assume 
therefore, that in Roman society navigable waterways complemented 
resource consumption which in turn complemented commerce.
These principles formed the foundation of California’s Public Trust 
Doctrine. 134
131 Joseph L. Sax, “Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its 
Historical Shackles,” University of California. Davis Law Review 14 (Winter 
1980); 185.
132Charles F. Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine,” E n v iro n m en ta l 
Law 19 (Spring 1989): 429-430. Hereafter, Wilkinson, "Headwaters."
133peter Birks, Grant Mcleod, and Paul Krueger, Justin ian’s Institu tes. 
(Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press): 55. Hereafter, Birks, Mcleod,
and Krueger, Ju s tin ia n s . For a more complete reading of the Institutes of 
Justinian see Mommsen, Theodor, Paul Krueger, and Alan Watson, The Digest of 
Ju s tin ian . vol. 1-4, (Philadelphia Pennsylvania: University o f Pennsylvania
Press, 1985).
134These laws were first introduced to California when the Spanish 
empire colonized Alta California at San Diego in 1519. Spanish and English 
water law had been substantially influenced by the Romans. For more 
information see, Meyer. Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
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The Spanish and English recognized the intrinsic value of 
navigation, resource consumption, and commerce in their version of 
the Public Trust Doctrine as well. For example, the English public 
trust was held by the monarch in all navigable waters subject to the 
"ebb and flow" of the t i d e ,  1 ^ 5  while those waters not subject to 
oceanic tides were available for exclusive ownership. This dichotomy 
reflects either the hydrological naivety of the crown or the 
assumption that the resources in non-navigable streams were either 
not significant enough to protect for public use or were better used 
by private entities. Nevertheless, the Magna Carta of 1215 
distinguished water rights between the jus privatum^ which the 
Crown could transfer to individuals in fee ownership, and the ju s  
publicum , which the Crown held in trust for the p u b l i c .  1̂ 6 Each rule 
allowed private benefits to be gained from water resources on one 
hand from private ownership, and on the other from private use. In 
any case, both the Spanish and the English recognized public 
interests and private rights in water resources, often leaving a 
blurred distinction between the two.
Contrary to the written Roman, Spanish, and English versions of 
the Public Trust Doctrine was the unwritten Native American axiom. 
Resources were held in trust by a group for the groups’ exclusive use. 
The trust interests included a complex interaction among resource 
consumption, spiritual enhancement, and environmental protection.
As one Indian said:
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our land which
135sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 69f. 
136)^ilkinson, "Headwaters," supra note 132, 430-431.
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is our body; and the values of our culture which is our soul; but 
water is the blood of our tribes, and if its life-giving flow is 
stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die and the many thousands 
of years of our communal existence will come to an end.^^^
The tribal community protected their resources to satisfy their
interests. Every culture, whether Spanish, English, or Native
American, defines its own public-trust interests depending upon its
interpretation of the role of natural resources in its society. These
resource interpretations reflect conscious and subconscious beliefs as
to what is important for “their” public. When environmental
interpretations and other public interests from diverse groups
collide, public-trust interests must also collide. In those cases, which
interests should the Public Trust Doctrine protect?
Early Anglo-American interests replicated those outlined in the
English Common Law. Geographically, the sporadic agricultural
settlements on the eastern seaboard reflected landscapes and
resources very similar to those of England, resulting in nearly
universal espousal of English water l a w .  138 The public trust of the
colonies stated that navigable waterways, subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide, were held in trust by the government of each state on
behalf of the public for "fishing, fowling, and n a v i g a t i o n . " 1 3 9  On the
other hand, westward expansion revealed substantial geographical
differences between water distribution in England and that of the
137American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc. Indian W ater 
Policv in a Changing Environment 2 (1982).
138xhis was riparian water law. For a discussion on the development of 
United States water laws from riparianism see Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, 
Watp.r Î (7SOurce Management, supra note 85 or Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, 
Tontrol. supra note 56.
139Robert Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance, "Collectivism in Northern 
New England." Boston University Law Review 30 (1950).
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new frontier. Droughts were common and rivers like the 
Mississippi, Sacramento, and Columbia were large enough to navigate 
but not subject to oceanic tides. Hence, the people needed new 
methods of water allocation and the government required a new 
definition of public-trust waterways. The new rule of "navigable in 
fact" allowed specific testing of waterways to determine their 
prospects for navigation and other public-trust i n t e r e s t s . ! 40
In the late nineteenth century, the development of California’s 
Public Trust Doctrine isolated the concept of “navigable in fact” as the 
primary determination of which waters maintained public-water 
r i g h t s . ! 4 i  Rivers were corridors for transportation and commerce, 
connecting the booming mining and agricultural economies with the 
rest of the world. Hydrologically, the Californians did not 
comprehend the importance of non-navigable stream flow and 
ground-water flow in maintaining the navigability of waterways.
Nor did they understand that other outside activities, such as logging, 
mining, road building, and urban development, were physically 
connected with fluvial morphology and, thus, their public-trust 
interests. To many people, the ability of society to affect navigable 
streams through large diversions of non-navigable streams was 
limited and seemingly beyond the scope of the technologies and 
populations of that time. Not until 1884, in People v. Gold Run Ditch
140xhe people were faced with an inadequate allocation system which 
led to the adoption of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. As the need to 
determine navigability grew, tests were developed such as the log floatation 
test where a log floating in a river had to clear the bottom of the stream or else 
the stream was not navigable. Of course, this definition depended upon the 
physical characteristics of the log itself.
141 Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 532-39, and
563-64.
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& Mining Company, did the California Supreme Court uphold an 
injunction prohibiting upstream hydraulic mining with water from 
non-navigable streams that impaired navigation on the American 
and Sacramento rivers, both navigable rivers. 1̂ 2 The court stopped 
private businesses from damaging the public interests of navigation, 
commerce, and fishing. 1̂ 3 it is important to note, however, that in 
both of these cases, even though the private water rights were 
damaging public interests, the court did not strip the appropriators 
of their water rights, but, instead, restricted their use.
The decision in the case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 
was the paramount judicial interpretation of the Public Trust 
Doctrine. In 1869, the State of Illinois conferred one thousand 
acres of Chicago's waterfront on Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central 
Railroad. Four years later, the State of Illinois attempted to revoke 
the absolute grant, citing a violation of the public trust. The court 
ruled that the state had no authority to convey certain resources that 
were outside its propriety. In fact, the court stated that even though 
the state was free to convey lands that it held in its proprietary 
capacity, the lands in question were the common property of the 
people of Illinois, "held in trust" by the state, and therefore, outside 
government jurisdiction. 1̂ 5 jn short, the grant was annulled.
l^^people V. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Company 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152
(1884).
l^^protection of fishing resources was not mentioned in the opinion. 
Nonetheless, the ruling helped decrease streams sediment flows which should 
have benefited fish populations.
144Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387 (1892) For an 
overview of the case and its implications see Sax, "Effective Judicial 
Intervention," supra note 128, 471-566.
145ibid.
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indicating that neither the state nor any other public or private 
agency had control over certain public resources within state 
boundaries.
The Illinois decision redefined the scope of America’s Public 
Trust Doctrine and the government's role in protecting public-trust 
resources. There were three questions raised by the case. First, 
since the state did not hold authority over the public-trust resources 
within its borders, who owned those resources and how were those 
resources governed? Second, which resources were public-trust 
resources, and who made that determination? Third, why did the 
government disregard its power of eminent d o m a i n  146 in its efforts 
to reclaim the granted public property?
The objective of the Public Trust Doctrine continued to evolve 
as the popular perceptions of the values and uses of waterways 
changed. The public trust which had traditionally protected 
navigation, commerce, and fisheries now included the right to fish, 
hunt, bathe, swim, navigate, and use the bottom of navigable waters 
for anchoring, standing, or other p u r p o s e s .  1 4 7  within the last decade, 
the California Supreme Court has recognized that uses of public-trust 
resources include the preservation of the land, especially tideland, in 
its natural state to serve as ecological units for scientific study, as
146Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use. 
In the United States, the power of eminent domain is founded in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The power to take private 
property for a public purpose requires the government to furnish "just 
compensation" to the owners of the confiscated property. See Black, L aw  
D ic tio n ary , supra note 129, 273.
147Joseph Sax, "Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical 
Shackles," Universitv of California. Davis Law Review 14 (Winter 1980): 189.
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open space, and as habitat for birds and aquatic l i f e .  1 4 8  addition,
before any water can be appropriated, the doctrine requires the 
courts and the State Water Resources Control Board to perform a 
balancing test to weigh the potential value to society of a proposed or 
existing diversions against their impacts on trust r e s o u r c e s .  1 4 9  y ^ e  
action which will best protect public-trust values is to be 
implemented. Yet, in administering the public trust, the courts and 
the Water Resources Board have been forced to favor one public use 
over another.
Contem porary Public Trust Im plem entation
California's 1983 Supreme Court decision in National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County^^^ expounded the 
developing clash between public interests and private rights in water 
resources. In 1940, the Division of Water Resources (DWR), 
predecessor of the State Water Resources Control Board, granted the 
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles a permit 
to appropriate virtually the entire flow of four of the five streams 
flowing into Mono Lake. Even though at that time, the DWR 
acknowledged that environmental destruction would supervene their 
grant, they felt powerless to oppose section 1254 of the California 
Water Code which stated, "...declared to be the established policy of 
this state that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest
148Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater Resource M anagem ent, supra 
note 85, 447.
149jhis regulation has been in the California Water Code § 1255 for a 
long time. Only now is it being enforced. I will cover this in detail later in the 
p a p e r .
i^Ojsjational Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County 33 Cal. 
3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709
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use of w a t e r . "  1 5 1  However, section 1255 of the California Water Code
which also existed at that time authorized the DWR to reject
appropriations “...when in its judgment, the proposed appropriation
would not best conserve the public i n t e r e s t . ” i 5 2  Forty-three years
after the appropriation was approved, the court found that the
diversions from Mono Lake’s tributaries decimated the brine-shrimp
populations, seagull nesting and breeding habitats, and the scenic
beauty of the Mono Lake region. In addition, the court ruled that
even though the DWR's grant in 1940 was within the bounds of
constitutional and legislative law, it violated the public trust and was
therefore, revocable. 153
The primary dilemma in water-resource allocation is that
it is naturally exclusive. James L. Huffman wrote that,
“democracy is capable of confirming, as public rights, popular
expectations which have the purpose and effect of
disadvantaging particular segments of s o c i e t y . ” 1 5 4  \n Audubon,
the court insisted that one of the Public Trust Doctrine's central
ideas is that public water rights have priority over all private
water rights. Yet, central to this issue was that Los Angeles’
public right to domestic water was manifested in a private
water right. The court conceded that:
The prosperity and habitability of much of this state requires the 
diversion o f great quantities of water from its streams for 
purposes unconnected to any navigation, commerce, fishing.
151Califomia Water Code § 1254 (West's Supplement 1995).
152California Water Code § 1255 (West's Supplement 1995).
153Opinion of Justice Broussard in National Audubon 33 Cal, 3d 419, 189 
Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709.
154Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128, 565-584.
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recreation, or ecological use relating to the source stream. The 
state must have the power to grant non-vcsted usufructuary 
rights to appropriate water even if  diversions harm o th e r  public 
trust uses. Approval of such diversion without considering all 
public trust values, however, may result in needless destruction 
of those values.^
There were two competing public interests in this case. First, 
the public interest of protecting Mono Lake from environmental 
degradation, and second, the public interest of providing domestic 
water to California's largest urban area. This simple paradox 
illustrates that every beneficial and reasonable use of water by one 
public- or private-interest group infringes upon the possible 
beneficial uses of other public-interest groups. In contemporary 
California, this is especially true since water resources are unevenly 
distributed throughout the state and, in many areas, natural supplies 
cannot satisfy high demand. The Public Trust Doctrine allows the 
courts to choose which public interests are the most important for 
California's citizens. Should courts decide these questions?
Another important aspect of this case was the geographical 
expansion of the public trust water right. The court stated, "...the 
power of the state...ex tends to the revocation of previously granted 
rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought 
free of the t r u s t . " T h o s e  lands and waters came to include areas 
outside navigable streams. As Justice Broussard wrote.
The course of the Public Trust Doctrine is the state’s authority as
155opinion of Justice Broussard in National Audubon 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 
Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709. (emphasis added).
156ibid.
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sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over 
the navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those 
waters. This authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono 
Lake...[because] such diversions harm the interests protected by 
the public trust. ̂  ^ ^
Not only did the court dictate the public interests protected by the 
public trust, but it also expanded the scope of the doctrine to include 
all water bodies tributary to navigable water bodies. This 
interpretation expands the doctrine to include all ground water and 
surface-water resources connected in any way to the navigable 
waterways within state boundaries.
Conflicts between competing public interests are not new to 
California. Each of the 500 aboriginal sibs had their own public 
interests in California's water resources. When those interests were 
threatened by other public interests (other groups), they were 
fiercely d e f e n d e d .  1̂ 8 Cultural and economic homogeneity within 
each tribe made identifying their public interests simple, while 
outside entities represented conflict. Contrary to the California 
Indians, the Spanish and Mexican colonials were not as homogenous. 
Water resources were needed by the missions, pueblos, and presidios 
for agricultural and domestic uses. As their populations grew and 
demands for water increased, public interests diverged, and cultural 
conflicts ensued. For example, conflicts developed between the 
pueblo at Branciforte and the Mission at Santa Cruz for use of the 
waters of the San Lorenzo River. Both were public entities and both
157ibid.
l^^Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 23.
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had valid public claims to the water. The dispute ended when the 
upstream mission limited the water supply of the downstream 
pueblo to the extent that the occupants of the pueblo were forced to
m o v e .  159 The cablido, or pueblo council, only represented the
pueblo's interests and was, thereby, unable to satisfy the interests of 
the mission and resolve the problem. Therefore, in order for a 
central authority to assuage public interests and equitably adjudicate 
water resources, cultural homogeneity is essential. California 
advocates the principle that strength in society is a product of 
cultural diversity, and central authorities, by their very nature, 
cannot represent that diversity.
E x p e c ta t io n s
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state and 
federal governments have encouraged water resource manipulation 
throughout California’s Anglo history. 160 the gold miners diverted 
water for mineral extraction and the farmers and developers
reclaimed marshlands, the government adopted the Doctrine of Prior
Appropriation, wrote the Reclamation Act, and privatized resource 
extraction on state-owned lands. Many of these formal actions 
eventually exacerbated problems in water resource degradation.!6 1
!59Afeyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
lOOReclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat.388 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-620), The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 50 Stat.
884. The California Central Valley Project Act § 11100 California Water Code 
(W est’s Supplement 1995).
161 Altering the natural flow of stream channels has many substantial 
impacts on the hydrological system. The morphometry of the stream is 
completely altered and thus, things related to the morphometry such as size 
and amount of sediment load, ground-water discharge, and erosional ability 
are substantially altered as well. These in turn change the biological make-up 
of the surrounding ecosystem, and can lead to species relocation or extinction.
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Nevertheless, constitutional rights guaranteed domestic and 
agricultural consumption while legislative, executive, and judicial 
policies were continually implemented, strengthening and 
reaffirming exploitative actions and private resource r i g h t s .  1 ^ 2  j n  
the name of the public interest, water-resource exploitation was 
encouraged by every level and branch of government.
Since the rules made by legislators and administrators have, in 
large part, caused much of California's rampant environmental 
destruction, proponents of the Public Trust Doctrine argue that, even 
though they have contributed to the problem, we must look to the 
courts for our s a l v a t i o n .  1 ^ 3  The central contention in defending the 
doctrine is that democracy sometimes does not work and in some 
instances democratic decisions are ultimately found to be 
unjustifiable. Instead, the Public Trust Doctrine gains its power 
from the free will of the people as it changes through time. Joseph 
Sax stated:
To understand the nature of the public claim on water, it is useful 
to look back to a time when the use of water to promote 
industrialization was considered a primary, if not exclusive, 
public goal. At that time there were cases recognizing a right to 
pollute, but—significantly—not a property right to pollute. In 
other words, when the public interest was seen as primarily 
developmental, people were permitted to use water in the service 
of development. They were not being vested with a private
162Article X, sec. 2 of the California Constitution, the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriation, the Reclamation Act, private water rights in state lands, etc. 
163Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128, 565-584. 
164njid.
6 9
property right that could be asserted against that interest when
public goals changed.^
The central contradiction here is that if the majority of people think 
that pollution is warranted, then it is. But if the representative 
government, acting as the operational mechanism of the people, 
thinks pollution is warranted, then it is not.
The very purpose of a government's existence is to serve the 
public interest while simultaneously protecting the private citizen's 
r i g h t s . T h e  Public Trust Doctrine eliminates the natural 
assumption that the government is acting on behalf of the people. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, some supporters believe 
that the people are powerless to change the principles represented 
by the government when their interests are challenged. In a 
functioning democracy, public authorities articulate the public 
interest through legislative action. What logical interpretations 
conclude that the counter-majoritarian courts by dictating 
noncommittal public interests are protecting public interests from 
the democratic legislature? If people want change, then they have 
the obligation as individuals to create change through democratic 
institutions.
The expectations that people hold about their government and 
the laws that the government hold in their interest is a central figure 
in understanding uncertainty in California's water-resource 
allocation. As seen in the Audubon case, the California Water Code 
states that the most beneficial use of water is for domestic purposes.
IGSjoseph L. Sax, “The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters,” 
Environm ental Law 19 (Spring 1989): 476.
l^^Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128: 565-66.
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the next highest use is for agriculture, and all other uses are subject 
to those uses.167 The diversity of interests, as written in the law, 
precludes a central authority from spontaneously defining the 
primary public interest at any point in time. "Words are the signals 
that inform people of their rights and responsibilities. Therefore, it 
is important to the satisfaction of reasonable expectations that the 
Public Trust Doctrine be interpreted by courts as it is understood by 
ordinary people." 168 The Public Trust Doctrine violates these 
expectations since all existing water rights which adversely impact 
public-trust values (whatever those might be at a given point in 
time) are now subject to reconsideration and modification by a court 
in the name of the public trust. 169 Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine 
finds its power in the governments' and peoples’ refusal to abide by 
previously stated and supported law.
Modifying previously granted water rights, under the guise of 
the public trust, means forsaking previous commitments to private 
water users. Private property rights were once justified principally 
on the market theory that a rational profit maximizer who owns 
natural resources will utilize those resources in a manner that not 
only optimizes his or her own interest but also society's overriding 
interest in the efficient use of the resource, i^o For example, farmers
167California Water Code § 1254 (West's Supplement 1995).
168James L. Huffman, “A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in
a Constitutional Democracy,” Environmental Law 19 (Spring 1989): 532.
Hereafter, Huffman, "A Fish Out of Water."
169Harrison C. Dunning, “The Significance of California’s Public Trust 
Easement for California Water Rights Law,” University of California. Davis Law 
Review  14 (Winter 1980): 397.
170Richard J. Lazarus, “Changing Conceptions of Property and 
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,”
Iowa Lqw Review 71 (1986): 650. Hereafter, Lazarus, "Changing Conceptions."
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irrigate crops so that they may grow food to sell for private gain.
The readily available food derived from the crop presumably 
satisfies the public interest. In this case, both public and private 
benefits are derived from irrigation. Today, however, the irrigation 
water used may reduce stream flows for spawning salmon, deprive 
thirsty cities of needed water, or deplete aquifers of farmers many 
miles away. Each public interest is inextricably tied to a private 
interest and vice versa. Thus, involuntary reallocation gives some 
Californians free access to water resources for their "public" uses to 
which they historically have not had access. In so doing, they are 
applying their own definitions of beneficial use. Some people will 
have no difficulty in refusing to protect agricultural expectations and 
interests, but others will disagree. Violating expectations through 
judicial interpretation will nullify a substantial portion of California's 
written water law.
C om m ons
The Public Trust Doctrine does not establish the public’s 
obligation to public-trust resources. Garret Hardin’s, "The Tragedy of 
the Commons," predicted the eventual overexploitation of all 
resources used in common by the public and that “freedom in 
commons brings tragedy to all.” 7̂i Later versions countered his 
claims, arguing that, when resources degrade or diminish, local 
communities organize to control commons access and articulate a set
171 Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 
1243-1248.
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of r u l e s .  172 California’s water resources cannot be governed in a 
localized manner because water moves between phases of the 
hydrologie cycle and between geographical locations, preventing it 
from being an isolated local resource. Thus, water resources are 
particularly vulnerable to degradation simply because the ill effects 
are rarely linked to a particular place or practice. The wider the 
variety of public-trust uses in the resource, the less chance of 
identifying the degrading culprit and, thus, the less chance of 
enacting good legislation. 173 Common access to water resources 
poses a substantial threat.
Historically, secondary extractive uses were secured as 
legitimate public interests under the Roman, English, and American 
Public Trust Doctrines. 174 Yet, this illusory security ignored the 
complexity of ecosystem function and the resulting chain-reaction of 
resource depletion. For example, it is rarely disputed that in the 
eighteenth century exploitative fishing in "common" English waters 
resulted in massive resource depletion, creating an expanded interest 
in the bountiful cod populations of the New World. 175 The English 
Public Trust Doctrine protected and encouraged private consumptive 
uses in common public resources which directly occasioned their 
demise. Clearly, although the social intentions were noble, the
172David Feeny, et. al., “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years
Later,” Human Ecology 18 (1990): 13.
173Non-point source pollution is one example of this problem. Non- 
Point sources are those sources of pollution that cannot be identified at a 
specific point. Instead, they can be generalized to a particular area. Often, the 
pollution is a cumulative effect from many small sources.
174girks, Mcleod, and Krueger, Ju s tin ia n is . supra note 133.
175Gillian T. Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660 
(Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1969): 3f, 23f, 26, lOOf.
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doctrine's historical scope was rooted in misperceptions about the 
bio physical environment, both in terms of hydrological principles 
and ecosystem function. Unfortunately, these oversights were 
instrumental in the creation of California's Public Trust Doctrine.
The Spanish experienced many similar problems in their 
common water resources in California. Multiple-use common waters 
were used to clean laundry, remove waste, irrigate crops, and engage 
in recreation. Oftentimes, careless individuals would degrade 
drinking water by bathing in, building cesspools near, or allowing 
their cattle near the main ditch. The result was a polluted water 
supply which the centralized local officials could not prevent, even 
though they levied fines and s a n c t i o n s . ! 7 6
Therefore, in order to preserve water resources through the 
Public Trust Doctrine, the public must undertake a strict obligation 
not to harm the water resource. Trampling spawning grounds in the 
public interest of recreation, eroding stream beds in the interest of 
anchoring, and polluting water bodies with human waste and refuse 
will harm the common resource. Many persons would absolve 
themselves from such an accusation, but upon close scrutiny, water 
degradation may be an unconscious a c t . ! 7 7  The Public Trust Doctrine 
represents noble ideology but it relies on archaic perceptions of 
homogenous societies with shared beliefs as to how water should be 
manipulated and used.
!76Meyer, Water in the HispanLC_Southwest. supra note 43.
!77Alvin J. Greenberg, "The Quality of Water," in C a lifo rn ia 's  
Threatened Environment. Restoring the Dream, ed. Tim Palmer (Washington, 
D C.: Island Press, 1993), 94-108.
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The primary goal of the Public Trust Doctrine is to equitably 
reallocate water to its most beneficial use. Although the goal is 
justified, the doctrine fails to confront the problems of diverging 
public interests, satisfying private expectations, and sharing common 
waters. Some say that if taken to an extreme, the Public Trust 
Doctrine could wholly undermine state water law by making all 
permits and licenses tenuous. ̂  78 Others say that the Public Trust 
Doctrine is vitally important because it provides a means of control 
over precious natural resources threatened with irreparable harm 
not anticipated in an earlier time when development was the prime
consideration. 179
California's government derives its authority from the 
agreement of free individuals. But the Public Trust Doctrine is rooted 
in the type of common-law assumptions, such as the ancient 
reservation of a trust interest, that modern administrative law was 
designed to displace through written law. It fuels a developing clash 
in liberal ideology between furthering individual rights of security 
and dignity, tied to private-property protection, and intrusive 
governmental programs designed to achieve longer-term collectivist 
goals by supporting environmental protection and resource- 
preservation. Its flexibility comes at the expense of individual 
security that is so important to resource stability.^ so Finally, it 
undermines the fact that the best form of government is democracy.
178Huffman, "A Fish Out of Water," supra note 167, 5 6 4 -6 5 .  
179Michael C. Blumm, "Public Property and the Democratization of 
Western Water Law: A  Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine."
E n v ir o n m e n ta l  Law 19 (Spring 1989): 573 .
ISOLazarus, "Changing Conceptions," supra note 170, 631.
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Good representative democratic systems make as few decisions as 
possible through the government. If public resource allocations are 
perceived to be a problem, we should look at the possibility of 
improving the private-rights system before resorting to an arcane 
doctrine that probably never meant what its proponents claim it 
means and that ignores the fact that the foundation of our resource 
allocation system is private property rights.^^i
181 Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128, 565.
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CHAPTER 6
WATER MARKETING
As mentioned above, a water transfer requires a change in 
either the point of diversion, place of use, or type of use historically 
associated with a water right. The transfer remains intact as long as 
it does not adversely affect other water-right holders on the body of 
water. Similarly, relying upon these same restrictions, water 
marketing encourages the voluntary transfer of established water 
rights through market mechanisms. In fact, many California water 
planners wish to establish a market system free and responsive 
enough to allow the water-deficient parts of the state to obtain water 
upon short notice from areas with a surplus s u p p l y .  182  The idea 
gained popularity during the prolonged drought between 1987 and 
1992. In 1991, after four drought years and three winter months of 
meager precipitation, California’s water supplies had plummeted to 
critical levels. Storage in major reservoirs was below fifty percent, 
the lowest level in California’s history, and many counties had 
declared drought e m e r g e n c i e s .  1 8 3  With no end in sight, Governor 
Wilson signed Executive Order No. W-3-91 which commissioned the
182Departmenl of Water Resources, "Water Transfers in California: 
Translating Concept into Reality," (November 1993): 7, 9.
183Department of Water Resources, "The 1991 Drought Water Bank," 
(January 1992): 1.
7 7
development of a “drought water b a n k . 8 4  The bank established a 
market system which allowed willing sellers to sell water to the 
"bank" which in turn sold the water to entities with critical needs.
The success of the water bank in saving the state from a potential 
disaster revived interest in water reallocation through a market 
system. By 1992, Governor Wilson had directed every government 
agency to encourage water marketing as a Level 1 response to 
increased urban and environmental demands. Level 1 responses are 
those that have “undergone extensive investigation and 
environmental analyses and are judged to have a higher likelihood of 
being implemented." 18 5
The goal of water marketing is to allow water users, 
particularly farmers, to redistribute water resources to higher value 
uses through a market system. These higher valued uses include 
urban consumption, in-stream flows, and high-valued crop 
production. For example, water conserved through efficient water- 
management techniques could be traded or resold to other water 
users for reclaimed water or money. As long as each participant 
derived benefits from buying and selling the water, the market could 
be maintained. Increased conservation, resulting from an enlarged 
demand and growing economic profits, could lead to more 
competition among water suppliers and thus, more water available 
for redistribution. Although the market has theoretical cohesion.
^84Lioyd S. Dixon, Nancy Y. Moore, and Susan W. Schechter, 
"California's Drought Water Bank, Economic Impacts in the Selling Regions,’ 
RAND Corporation, 1993, 1-3.
185Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 12.
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unfortunately, real-world transactions have impacts beyond the 
scope of the traditional market.
Water markets can be studied by their effects on two 
subtopics: efficiency and d i s t r i b u t i o n .  1 8 6  Efficiency questions relate
to the amount of the resource available, while distributional 
questions address proportional sharing. For instance, in California, a 
certain amount of water could produce goods and services more 
highly valued in the market place if it were shifted from agricultural 
to industrial uses; this is an efficiency argument. On the other hand, 
this shift may damage the interests of a farmer’s customers, 
employees, or suppliers while helping industrial interests; all 
distributional considerations. Is it possible to divide water resources 
in such a way that everybody profits from its use? Certainly not. In 
fact, any particular change in the direction of efficiency will involve a 
certain intrinsic change in the dispersal of gains and losses among 
distributional parties. In practice, it may be unfeasible and 
impractical to effect a redistribution of water such that everyone 
gains.187 Nevertheless, just as with the Public Trust Doctrine, the 
goal of water marketing is to maximize gains to as many people as 
possible. The principal concern however, is the extent to which the 
owner of a water right may change the place or purpose of water use 
with respect to its historical use, possibly inflicting injury upon "third 
parties."1̂  ̂ Despite these fears, many economically oriented policy
186xhomas Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Econom ics. 
3d. ed., (New York: HarberCollins Publishers, Inc., 1992): 18-69. Hereafter,
Tietenberg, Environm ental Economics.
187Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and 
E r n n n m ic s  2 4  (October 1960): 110.
188Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 457.
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analysts and influential segments of the national environmental 
community enthusiastically endorse water marketing because it 
could simultaneously pacify many competing public and private 
water interests.
M a r k e ts
Economic theory asserts one almost universal principle which 
characterizes an efficient allocation—the principle of equimarginal 
value. The value of any unit of water purchased by a person is 
essentially measured by the maximum quantity of resources which 
the consumer would be willing to trade for that unit. Marginal value  
is the value of the last unit acquired which normally declines as the 
quantity of water acquired increases. The principle, then is that 
water should be so allocated that all persons derive equal value from 
the marginal (last) unit acquired. When this unit of water is valued 
equally by each party based upon the benefit that they can derive 
from it, then there are no more mutually advantageous trades and 
efficiency has been attained. Any person who found himself with so 
much water that the marginal value to him was less than market 
price would be trying to sell water, while anyone with a marginal 
value greater than market price would be seeking to buy. It is best 
summarized in the basic economic theory of supply and demand.
Tietenberg has outlined the essential components for a perfect 
water market:
1. Property rights must be well-defined
a. Ownership
b. Specification of rights
c. Transferability
8 0
2. The market must have many buyers and sellers
3. Resources must be mobile
4. The participants must have good information system s!89 
Obviously, the perfect market has its limitations. Buying and selling 
water will only be perfectly efficient if no third-parties are affected 
by the transaction, which will, of course, never be the case. To 
permit the operation of the market in apparent total disregard for 
the special needs and requirements of various interests in an area 
which arouses such intense anxiety as does water, particularly in 
California, is u n w i s e . T h u s ,  when a market must accommodate 
outside interests and other variables, it becomes imperfect, 
sometimes leading to total market failure.
When a market becomes imperfect, at least one of the following 
conditions is present:
• External social groups influence market activities
• Joint consumption of the resource exists where outsiders 
benefit (at no expense) from the transaction
• Imperfect competition occurs because either there are not 
enough buyers or sellers, or individual buyers and/or sellers 
can influence market prices
• Market information is inaccurate
• Acceptable risk varies among buyers and sellers
• Public policies affect market processes!*!
• Incomes are unevenly distributed!
!89Tielenberg, Environm ental Econom ics, supra note 186, 83-9.
!*9^rlhur H. Chan, "To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Interstate
Waters," M^^iiral Resources Journal 29 (1989): 547. Hereafter Chan "To Market
or Not to Market."
!91Saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 235-63.
192 Victor Brajer, et. al., "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water 
Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West," 
N a t u r a l  PesQurces Joumal 29 (1989): 492.
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• Highly variable transaction costs 
A perfect market exists only in theoretical models. Outside interests 
always have an interest in economic decisions made by governments, 
corporations, or individuals. But as imperfect as the market may be, 
the ultimate goal is to give as many individuals and groups access to 
the market so that they may further their particular interests and 
goals as they see fit.
Resource shifts are common in our dynamic economy and are 
the source of much of our economic and social growth. As new 
values arise, pressure increases to modify allocative processes in 
order to recognize and accommodate new demands. Reliance upon 
market processes is consistent with the belief that individuals or 
groups of individuals are the best judges of their own well-being and 
have the right to make economic decisions in pursuit of their own 
interests. Since their are so many interests in water resources and a 
readily available water supply, a water market is capable of 
resupplying those interests that society and individuals deem 
important. Nevertheless, buyers and sellers will only participate in 
water markets if they believe that they have something to gain, 
whether the gain is characterized by spiritual or economic 
prosperity. Therefore, three conditions must be met for a water 
transaction to take place between a buyer and a seller:
1. The buyer must expect returns from investment to be 
more than the cost of the water and all costs associated 
with the transfer
2. The seller must receive a price that equals or exceeds his 
returns from actual use of the water
8 2
3. The buyer must view the transfer as the most
economically attractive method to acquire water 193
Although problems exist, water marketing can encourage water users
to conserve water in pursuit of individual self-interests while
simultaneously supplying water for other more beneficial public
uses.
Transferability of rights is the central requirement for 
sustaining the efficiency of a market system. Economic and social 
transfer costs are associated with each aspect of a water transaction; 
from the individual buyers and sellers, to the impacts on plants, fish, 
and wildlife or other externalized third parties. As transfer costs 
increase, water prices increase, and the chances of reallocating a 
water supply decrease. Thus, reducing impediments to the free 
transfer of water rights on both a permanent and temporary basis is 
essential if water marketing is ever to become more than a 
theoretical solution to water allocation p r o b l e m s .  194
T y p e s
Although formalities differ among jurisdictions, the prevailing 
rule in California is that most appropriative water rights may be sold 
and/or transferred to different l a n d s .  195 The framework for these 
transfers remains relatively static, giving transferees and transferors 
some latitude in how they wish to carry out the physical transfers.
193saliba, Water M arkets, supra note 103, 20-24.
194Robert Milliman, "Water Law and Private Decisionmaking: A
Critique," Journal o f Law and Economics 2 (1959): 41, 46. Transaction costs will
be explored later in detail.
195 Gould, George A. "Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to 
Industrial Use," Racky^M ountain Mineral Law Institute 27B (1982): 1791, 1820.
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Water marketing can be expressed in many forms, including the 
purchasing of permanent water rights, temporarily leasing water 
through dry-year options, water banking, or many other innovative 
arrangem ents.
Perm anent W ater Sales
Permanent sales of water are the most common type of 
transfer in water markets, In many instances, water-rights 
holders sell their entire entitlements to other purchasers, while in 
others, they sell only a portion of their entire water right.
Procedures and restrictions on the sale of senior water rights depend 
on the nature of the rights and the jurisdiction in which they are 
l o c a t e d . H o l d i n g  a private water-right variously requires filing a 
decree at the county courthouse; obtaining a license or permit issued 
by a state agency; purchasing a “share” of a mutual water company’s 
stock; sustaining a pattern of historical use without written record; 
acquiring ownership of riparian land; or purchasing a water-delivery 
contract with local, state, tribal, or federal water agency. In many 
cases, the rights held in “water jurisdictions” overlap, since water 
movement rarely coincides with arbitrarily drawn political 
boundaries. Nevertheless, permanent water sales are embodied in a
l^^Saliba, Water M arkets, supra note 103, 46-52.
197The state legislature has a general framework for the general rules 
of water marketing but many smaller entities have prohibitions on water 
transfers. For example, many areas such as Yuba county prohibit the free 
transfer o f ground water out of their basin fearing that the water would 
denude their surrounding ground water resources. Other entities such as 
irrigation districts in the Central Valley forbid the transfer of surface- and 
ground water siting possible declines in the economic stability of their region.
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variety of methods that compensate for the differing types of water 
ownership and the multitudinous jurisdictional problems.
The majority of California water transfers involve surface 
water. However, ground-water rights have accompanied the 
purchase of many water ranches in areas where ground-water rights 
are separately transferable. One such market has existed for many 
years in the Los Angeles area. Beginning in the 1960s, a local court 
established ground-water basins in the Los Angeles region and 
assigned pumping rights to individual ground-water users. Those 
residents who hold such rights are still free to lease ground water 
each season, or to sell their rights permanently. In order to facilitate 
transfers, the court established a state-sponsored clearinghouse for 
the annual leasing of pumping rights. The rights are leased at a set 
price that reflects operating costs, local water assessments, and the 
cost of imported water. The success of the program has allowed for 
several thousand acre-feet of ground water to be leased each year in 
the Los Angeles a r e a .  1̂ 8
Not all water purchases are made to fulfill the needs of cities, 
developers, irrigators, and other end users. Many individuals and 
corporations have bought water rights simply because they believe 
the value of water rights will escalate. A typical investment 
transaction involves the purchase of irrigation water rights and a 
leasing back of the rights to the farmer for continued irrigation until 
the investor is ready to resell the rights. The lease-back provision 
can be critical, not only in order to create annual benefits from the
l^Ssteven J. Shupe, Gary D. Weatherford, and Elizabeth Checchio, 
"Wester Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation," Natural Resources Journal 29
(Spring 1989): 416-27.
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water during the holding period, but also to continue the beneficial 
use of surface rights to protect them from f o r f e i t u r e .  1 ^ 9
Another prominent type of permanent water-right purchase is 
called “water ranching.” Irrigators are often reluctant to sell water 
rights independent of the land, because land without water is of little 
economic value in many parts of California. The factor has led to the 
purchase of water ranches—lands conveyed solely for their 
associated water rights. Many economists argue that selling land and 
water together solely for the water right needlessly consolidates 
resources, and should not take p l a c e .200  Others believe that this type 
of permanent water purchase could drastically alter both the 
economic and social infrastructure of rural towns in C a l i f o r n i a . 2 0 1
Many Southern California water users who depend upon water 
supplies from the Colorado River have explored the possibility of 
buying property with water rights in other states and transporting 
the water through the Colorado River Aqueduct or the All-American 
Canal into the urban areas of the s t a t e .202  Some water officials argue 
that it is unlawful to undertake interstate water ranching or water 
marketing while others maintain that to prevent interstate transfers 
and marketing perpetuates antiquated water-use patterns that run 
contrary to efficient water utilization and modern demands. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, that
199The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation requires that all water diverted 
from a stream be used beneficially or the right will be lost. The principle has
been coined the “use it or lose it” provision.
200xietenberg, Environm ental Econom ics, supra note 185, 60-7.
201 This argument is extremely important when addressing the issue of 
fairness in water distribution and will be covered in detail in later sections of 
this paper.
202Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 30, 63, 81-2, 106, 125, 356-60.
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water is an article of commerce, and that states cannot unreasonably 
restrict its interstate transport and s a l e . 2 0 3  Whatever the case, an 
increasing number of proposals for interstate water transfers will 
require obtaining the cooperation and coordination of state officials, 
which will no doubt prove to be a significant barrier to interstate 
water ranching and m a r k e t i n g . 2 0 4
Conversely, when a municipality or other user needs to 
purchase water rights, it is not always necessary to buy the 
appurtenant land. Major transactions in water rights in several areas 
have involved buying shares of agricultural water-districts stock 
independent of the land. This type of water transaction can take 
place through a "standing purchase offer” in which the municipality 
maintains an open invitation to buy excess water rights whenever 
farmers want to sell them. In any case, the majority of water-rights 
transactions simply involve a single sale between a buyer and seller, 
independent of standing offers, land purchases, or district shares. 
Private developers typically use this type of transaction for their 
subdivisions and commercial developments to satisfy ordinances that 
require them to dedicate water to the town in which the subdivision 
is to be l o c a t e d . 2 0 5  The developer will purchase a senior irrigation 
right, retire it, and dedicate the water to the domestic use associated 
with the development.
Another more common and more promising type of permanent 
water purchase is called a “conservation offset.” In this case, other 
water users that need a more reliable water supply can make water
203Sporhase v. Nebraska 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254. 
204(3ould, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 476.
205ibid.
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conservation investments in another users senior water right. By 
financing the modernization of old irrigation systems, junior users 
may be able to make surplus water available for their use, while 
letting the senior user continue to irrigate the same amount of land 
with less water. Although the legal questions involving such an 
arrangement are complex, this strategy is being pursued in a number 
of areas around California.
In Southern California for example, several conservation 
strategies are being pursued to solidify municipal water supplies. In 
October 1988, the Bureau of Reclamation began a $5.2 million project 
to line 1.5 miles of the Coachella Canal in extreme Southern 
California. The project tested an in-place lining technique that was 
eventually used to seal large portions of the Coachella and All- 
American canals. Annual water savings resulting from the lining 
project totaled 100,000 acre-feet per year. The Metropolitan Water 
District (MWD) was a major proponent of the project and paid a large 
part of the bill in return for diverting a small portion of the salvaged 
w a t e r . 2 0 6  South of Coachella, the Imperial Irrigation District (HD) is 
engaged in a water conservation plan with the MWD that will 
eventually save 300,000 to 500,000 acre feet a year through canal 
lining, tail-water recovery, and other improvements. 2 0 7  The 
conservation offsets are positive responses to the water marketing 
system .
An agreement to exchange one water supply for another 
temporarily, seasonally, or permanently can prove advantageous to
206-Water Market Update 2 (October 1988): 3.
207ibid.
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parties with water rights that for some reason are not appropriate to 
their respective needs. For example, exchanges can be motivated by 
water-quality differences when a municipality exchanges its surface 
diversions for an irrigator's higher quality ground-water. More 
commonly, however, water exchanges are arranged in order to 
accommodate delivery of water to the place of need. For example, 
federal water rights on the eastern side of the Central Valley can be 
exchanged for federal rights in the Central Valley Project so that 
more water users can be accommodated.
Tem porary W ater Sales
The transfer of the right to use water need not be permanent.
In most jurisdictions, a water right may be leased for a season, a 
year, or many years. This temporary transfer can be an attractive 
option for both the transferor and transferee because it maintains 
continuity, preserves ownership by the holder of the right for future 
use, and accommodates intermediate uses. Parties to a water lease 
are able to customize the arrangement to accommodate their specific 
needs. For instance, to increase flexibility, the lease can contain an 
option for renewal or, to reduce future uncertainties, the rental rate 
can be indexed over time to reflect cycles of the economy. Short­
term leasing arrangements are powerful tools to pacify variable 
demands in geographical regions.
Between 1987 and 1992, Governor Wilson’s administration 
investigated several creative measures in an effort to ameliorate 
California’s prolonged drought. As noted earlier, the Governor 
created the "Drought Water Bank" in 1991 which, through free-
8 9
market purchases, redistributed “surplus” water throughout 
California through the state and federal water projects.208 The 
administrators of the water bank purchased water at $125.oo an 
acre-foot from those farmers willing to sell, and then resold the 
water at $175.®^ an acre-foot to cities for urban consumption, to 
environmentalists to maintain in-stream flows, and to farmers 
producing high-value crops. Initially, the state’s market system 
proved disappointing. Some farmers were denied permission to sell 
water by local irrigation districts while others feared that by selling 
their water, they might jeopardize the future of their water rights. 
Still others believed that they could force the state to double or triple 
its price.209 When heavy rains fell in March 1991, demands for 
emergency supplies were reduced, but many farmers, hoping not to 
lose the new option, changed their minds and allowed the state to 
purchase some 835,000 acre-feet.2io Though short of the state’s goal 
of a million acre-feet, this was still an impressive figure—more than 
the amount that Los Angeles uses in a normal year. Heavy March 
rains, however, created the problem of finding enough customers for 
all this “surplus” water. Nonetheless, Governor Wilson was so 
impressed by the amount of reallocated water that he re-established 
the water bank in 1992, which eventually led to its establishment on 
a permanent basis.2H The successes of the water bank prompted
208The Drought Water Bank was a reallocation system originally 
designed as a drought mitigation method. It has expanded interest in water 
transfers through m arket mechanisms.
209pepartment of Water Resources, "The 1991 Drought Water Bank," 
(January 1992).
210lbid., 2.
211 George Skelton and Jennifer Warren, “Urban Areas To Get More 
Water,” Los Angeles Times. 6 April 1991, A14. See also Virginia Ellis,
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several new sections of water transfer law related to water 
marketing in the California Water C o d e . 212
Another type of dry-year transfer is the dry-year option.
When water users normally have a reliable supply but are subject to 
unacceptable shortfalls in dry years, they can acquire an option to 
lease water from another party during those dry years. Dry-year 
options have been negotiated between some cities and farmers in 
C a l i f o r n i a . I n  1987, the MWD of Southern California initiated 
negotiations on a dry-year option with farmers in the Palo Verde 
Irrigation District for the right to use up to 100,000 acre-feet of their 
water during future dry years. The MWD offered the irrigators 
$200.00 for each acre they placed in the option program and a 
minimum of an additional $400.0 0  per acre each year that the MWD 
exercises its option and diverts the water to Southern California 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 2 14 The arrangement is set to last forty years, with 
the irrigators continuing to farm, except during those years in which 
the MWD exercises its option.2i5
In Northern California, the East Bay Municipal Utilities District 
(EBMUD) is assessing a dry-year option as one strategy to augment 
municipal water supplies. In July, 1988, EBMUD offered to enter into 
a long-term arrangement with local irrigators for a dry-year option.
In those years deemed "critically dry" by the state's index, EBMUD
“Panel OK’s Bill Easing Limits on Water Sales,” The Los Angeles Times. 5 June 
1991, A3, A19.
212Sections 109, 475, 1706, 1725-1746 of the California Water Code 
213California Water Code §§ 1725 to 1730 (West Supplement 1995).
214$. J Shupe and J. A. Folk-Williams, eds.. W ater, Market Update 1 (June 
1987): 8. Hereafter, Shupe, Water M arket.
215$hupe, W ater Market. February, 1988, 2.
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would purchase the irrigators’ water for about $50.^0 per acre-foot. 
The proposal proved controversial and was rejected by area water 
users who considered the purchasing price too low. Despite this 
setback, EBMUD is still exploring a dry-year option as one way to 
meet future water-supply needs. ^ 1 6
Subordination agreements achieve a purpose similar to that of 
dry-year option arrangements. They are based upon the fact that a 
major attribute of an appropriative water right is its relative 
priority, which can be marketed separately from the right itself. For 
instance, the subordination agreement could be useful for a city with 
a junior water right (for example, the fourth priority on a stream 
system) that needs to build a new water treatment plant, but cannot 
obtain financing because its water right is not judged reliable 
enough. If the city could purchase agreements from the holders of 
the three senior priorities, under which those holders would allow 
their rights to become subordinate in dry years, a more reliable 
water right could be created without any form of a transfer. A 
senior priority may be compromised for something other than 
money. It can be given up for storage rights or other benefits in a 
new water project.
Sharing W ater Rights
Other mechanisms to buy or lease water rights can include 
multiple parties, called "allocation with complementary uses." For 
instance, in California, maintaining in-stream flows could benefit a 
variety of public interests, such as hydroelectric production and
216ghupe, Water M a r k e r .  September, 1988, 2.
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environmental conservation. If a farmer wanted $150.^0 per acre- 
foot for his water right and the utility company only wanted to pay 
$50.00 per acre-foot, the sale would not take place. If, however, the 
State of California was willing to pay an additional $50.00 per acre- 
foot and a private environmental group was willing to pay $50.oo per 
acre-foot, then the transaction could take place. In such a situation, 
the groups could join assets and purchase the water rights at a price 
that would satisfy not only the hydroelectric and environmental 
uses, but the agronomist as well.^i? Creative approaches to long­
term or short-term water transfers through water markets could 
reallocate water efficiently, potentially benefiting a variety of public 
and private interests.
W ater Pricing
Water pricing is another efficiency c o n c e r n . 2 1 8  jn order to 
initiate water transfers through the market system, the prices for 
water must be below the marginal price for the buyers and above 
the marginal price of the sellers. Prices for agricultural water are far 
below the prices that most urban and environmental users are 
accustomed to paying. For example, in 1990, growers paid between 
$2.50 and $19.31 an acre-foot for untreated water from the federal 
Central Valley Project and between $22.^0 and $47.<̂  ̂ an acre-foot for 
untreated water from the State Water Project. The Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California, on the other hand, paid $233.^0
217Hirshleifer, et. al.. W ater Supply, supra note 120, 36-42. 
218Tietenberg, Environm ental Econom ics, supra note 185, 234-35.
9 3
for an untreated acre-foot of state w a t e r . 2 i 9  Furthermore, the 
cheaper agricultural water is distributed to farmers growing low­
valued crops, such as rice and cotton, declared to be in surplus and 
yet also eligible for additional subsidies from the federal 
government's price-support p r o g r a m . 220  The result is that the four 
California crops consuming the most water (rice, alfalfa, cotton, and 
irrigated pasture) produce little or no return. Even more disturbing 
is the fact that rice loses more water to evaporation than Los Angeles 
uses each y e a r .221  Clearly, water is not used efficiently. Farmers are 
willing to sell their water to turn a profit, while buyers need the 
water to pacify growing urban and environmental demands. Such 
deficiencies in allocation could be pacified through a free water 
market. Economic self-interest could cause the elimination of waste 
resulting in reallocations to more beneficial uses of water.
Water prices are determined by a variety of characteristics, 
such as reliability and flexibility in purpose and place of u s e . 2 2 2  The 
price of a water rights is positively related to quality, priority date, 
geographical flexibility, and administrative transaction costs. The 
price is expected to be negatively related to the size of the 
transaction: as the water acquisitions increase, the price per unit
d e c r e a s e s . 223 in a perfect water market, water prices would be 
determined only by water quality, priority date, the amount of the
219Dcpartment of Water Resources of the State of California, “The 1991 
Drought Water Bank," (January 1992): 5.
220pisani, Family Farm, supra note 113, 440-50.
221 Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 385
222fionnie G. Colby, et al., “Water Right Transactions: Market Values and
Price Dispersion,” Water Resources Research 29 (June 1993), 1565. Hereafter, 
Colby, et. al., "Water Right Transactions."
223ib id .
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transfer, and the transfer distance. Unfortunately, the real economic 
cost of transferring water must include administrative fees, legal 
fees, local taxes, state taxes, and other unexpected natural and social 
costs. If the extra costs of implementing a voluntary water transfer 
become too high, then many beneficial transfers will not take place 
and water supplies will remain locked into suboptimal patterns of
u s e . 2 2 4
Since regional economic changes have increased the demand 
for water in non-irrigation uses, and basin water supplies remain 
fixed, the real value of water rights increases over t i m e . 2 2 5  
Similarly, the priority date, or date that the water right was 
acquired, gains worth as demands for water grow. Prices paid for 
senior water rights that can be exercised throughout the summer 
peak demand period are three times higher than prices paid for 
junior water rights limited to diverting water during periods of high 
stream flows. On average, senior irrigation water rights fetch prices 
up to thirty percent higher per acre-foot than similar junior water 
rights, as long as the other factors remain c o n s t a n t . 2 2 6
Another pricing factor, geographical flexibility, refers to the 
geographical area within which a right can be moved to a buyer’s 
new place and purpose of use. These conveyance costs dampen the 
amount buyers are willing to pay for water rights, because the longer 
the distance that the water has to travel, the more water will be lost 
to natural processes, such as seepage and evaporation. Thus, the
224colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating Environmental Externalities," 
supra note 102, 770.
225Colby, et al., "Water Right Transactions," supra note 222, 1570. 
226ibid., 1569.
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further a buyer moves water, the higher the actual costs of that 
water will be. Other locational factors also affect the water price.
For example, water transferred to Los Angeles from the Colorado 
Plateau may be higher in dissolved minerals than is water 
transferred from the upper reaches of the Sacramento River. The 
degraded quality of the Colorado River water affects its value for 
certain uses. Hence, the geographical location of the original water 
resource will affect water pricing whether through distance 
transferred or projected quality upon arrival.
The final, but most important, factors in water pricing are 
transaction c o s t s . 227 These expenses are simply the costs associated 
with making the market system function. In California water 
markets, parties incur transaction costs in defining property rights 
unambiguously enough so that sales can take place, generating 
information about available water, searching for trading partners, 
ascertaining the characteristics of water rights, negotiating terms of 
exchange and contract provisions, enforcing both property rights and 
contracts for both the buyer and the seller, and obtaining legal 
approval for the proposed change in water u s e . 22  8 Transfer 
applicants and objectors incur other costs in this latter category as 
they seek to obtain state approval to transfer a water right to a new 
place and purpose of use. Costs incorporated into that study may 
include attorney’s fees, engineering surveys, and hydrological 
studies. These fees can be substantial and adversely affect a water- 
right transaction.
227colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating Environmental Externalities," 
supra note 102, 770 .
228 ibid.
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Another transaction cost is the cost, in both time and money, of 
litigation. Litigation to establish the legal standing of other public or 
private interests is often initiated in order to force current water- 
right holders to account for third-party externalities. For example, a 
transfer of a water right outside of its original watershed may cause 
damage to junior water rights holders or environmental systems 
normally associated with the transferred water. Under the constant 
threat of legal action, state procedures to evaluate proposed water 
transfers have become extremely complex and costly, since the 
administrative processes must fully address environmental impacts 
along with the traditional assessment of transfer impacts upon other 
water-right h o l d e r s . 2 2 9  in fact, the transfers can become so 
expensive, that the market system lapses into total f a i l u r e . 2 3 0
Parties undertake market transactions for economic gain based 
upon the perception that water supplies will generate higher returns 
in their new use than in their former use. The power to reduce this 
expected gain by imposing transaction costs gives third parties 
leverage with transfer proponents, forces transfer proponents to 
internalize some external costs of transfers, and gives other outside 
public and private values a role in the water-allocation process.231 
Although these "third parties" have legitimate claims, a productive 
water market in California could eliminate these internal costs.
2 2 9 ;y id
230In 1982, the California Legislature passed a series of laws promoting 
water transfers. In the four years that followed, not a single drop of water was 
moved. Some people suggest that the legal, environmental, and social 
evaluation costs were so high that selling the water would have been too 
expensive. The result was that the legislation that encouraged water transfers 
benefited no one.
231 Colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating Environmental Externalities," 
supra note 102, 770.
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because the intrusive public interests would have the power to 
satisfy their demands by buying their own water. As a result of 
these transaction costs, the market price does not accurately 
represent the value of the water, and price no longer dictates the 
beneficiallity of the water use. For example, since water transfers 
from the Owens Valley have been severely limited, and future 
transfers from the Colorado River will be reduced. Southern 
Californians are willing to pay at least six times the price per acre- 
foot that farmers are generally accustomed to paying for their 
water.232 However, once legal and administrative fees are added, the 
price of the water can increase to over ten times the value of the 
actual water. In a free water market, if environmental groups or the 
California voters thought that the water would better serve 
environmental interests, then they could purchase the water and 
apply it to those interests. Nevertheless, contemporary differences 
in marginal pricing between potential buyers and sellers cannot be 
overcome by market mechanisms, because the transaction costs 
involved are much too high, which, in turn, prevent the efficient 
allocation of water supplies.
232Abascal, Ralph Santiago and William G. Hoerger. California Rural 
Legal Assistance. Memo to board of supervisors regarding Water Transfers and 
Assembly bill 97. July 27, 1993
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CHAPTER 7 
CONTROVERSIES IN REDISTRIBUTION
Water is a scarce resource that must be distributed among 
diverse public and private interests. Because water is essential to 
sustain life and economic welfare, issues of fair distribution a r i s e . ^ 3 3  
The increase in water marketing, combined with the decrease in 
developing new supplies, has introduced new issues and complexities 
to California's water users and government officials. On one hand, 
state legislators must decide whether to take a passive role in 
allowing water markets to operate under existing law and policy, or 
to enact new laws either promoting or inhibiting water-rights 
transfers. On the other hand, water users must weigh the 
desirability of selling water rights and the trade-offs between one­
time economic gains versus long-term viability of regional 
econom ies.
Since water is highly mobile (it flows, evapotranspires, and 
seeps), it is difficult to define and measure property rights in water. 
Supply can be highly variable across seasons, years, and locations, 
and water quality varies as well. This mobility combined with the 
diversity of uses to which water can be put, create interdependencies 
among water users, such as junior users dependent upon return
233jarlock , Corbridge, and Gctches, W ater R e s o u r c e  M anagem ent, supra 
note 85, 19.
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flows and environmental concerns dependent upon in-stream uses. 
Competitive markets have many desirable attributes, but the 
interdependencies and public-goods characteristics associated with 
water resources imply that a perfectly competitive market is not a 
feasible water allocation process.^̂ 4 jn fact, any redistribution of 
water will produce a physical, biological, or social impact not directly 
involved in the market transaction. Thus, the external effects of 
water marketing can be studied in terms of efficiency (the actual 
market mechanism) and distribution (fairness in allocation).235
Physical Im pacts
Throughout California, water marketing is perceived by many 
as an effective way to promote water-use efficiency. The state 
legislature has been examining how efficiency in allocation can be 
promoted by allowing farmers who modernize wasteful irrigation 
systems to sell the water conserved. In an effort to foster greater 
cooperation among the state's numerous water districts and other 
regulatory agencies, and also to discourage wasteful practices, the 
legislature has authorized the transfer of water rights as long as 
other users suffer no serious loss.236 Likewise, the state qualified 
the "use it or lose it" principle of appropriation law by stipulating 
that rights to water unused because of conservation would not be 
lost. In other words, if a person achieved the same (or better) 
production goals using less water, by installing efficient irrigation or
234saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 24-6.
2 3 5 T i e t e n b e r g ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  E c o n o m i c s , s u p r a  n o t e  185, 16-49.
2 3 6 c a l i f o m i a  W a t e r  C o d e  § §  386 a n d  933 (1995 S u p p l e m e n t ) .  P a r t i a l  
l o s s e s  o f  w a t e r  r i g h t s  d u e  t o  c h a n g i n g  w a t e r  u s e s  o f  s e n i o r  u s e r s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  p a p e r .
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transfer technology, the right to the saved water was not 
d i m i n i s h e d . 2 3 7  Lawmakers have also encouraged conservation 
efforts by granting rights to reclaimed waste water to the person 
salvaging the w a t e r . 2 3 8  While impressive, these legislative advances 
that encourage conservation and reallocation are inherently 
deceptive.
The possibility of what might be achieved has been suggested 
in recent negotiations between the MWD of Southern California and 
the IID. The HD, located in the South-Lahontan hydrological region, 
has long transported water from the Colorado River, through the All- 
American and Coachella canals, to irrigate crops in the desert regions 
of the Imperial Valley. The majority of the canals associated with 
the irrigation district's delivery system were poorly constructed and 
have historically been sources of substantial water waste. As a 
result, excessive seepage from the physical canals, leakage through 
the canal gates, and substantial agricultural runoff is wasted— 
eventually flowing into the Sal ton Sea, a land-locked body of water 
in the South-Lahontan desert. In past years, the amount of waste­
water was so high that inflow into the lake exceeded evaporation, 
causing the sea to rise and flood adjacent lands. Since the water 
levels were rising and shoreline properties were damaged, the IID 
was under considerable legal pressure from the California c o u r t s 2 3  9
237California Water Code §§ 1112 and 993 (1995 Supplement).
2 3 8 H u n d l e y ,  The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 389.
239^gg Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 165 Cal. 
App. 3d 952, 212 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1985); Elmore v. imperial Irrigation District, 159 
Cal. app.3d 185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
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and from the SWRCB240 to conserve water and reduce the flow of 
"waste water" into the Salton S e a . 2 4 i  in 1984, the court ruled that 
the district was wasting substantial quantities of water through 
unreasonable use, and unless they divised a coherent conservation 
plan, they would lose their rights to the waters diverted from the 
Colorado River. In 1988, the district presented a plan, but could not 
produce the money to pay for it. Eventually, the SWRCB and the 
courts forced IID into an agreement with the MWD in which the 
latter offered to finance the repairs to the canals as long as they 
retained the rights to all of the conserved water.
The bargain was solidified in 1989, and the MWD lined the All- 
American and Coachella canals and many other smaller irrigation 
ditches while simultaneously recovering tail water from wasteful 
irrigation practices. The result of the conservation effort allows the 
MWD to recover nearly 200,000 acre feet of water every year. The 
farmers have also gained from the transaction, since they did not 
have to pay for the repairs and because they contracted to sell the 
water to the MWD for thirty-five years at an annual cost of about 
$128.®^ per acre-foot.242 This tremendous conservation project has 
fulfilled the court order to repair the ditches and reclaim the wasted 
water of the irrigators while simultaneously redirecting the water to 
a more beneficial public use in Southern California.243
2 4 0 D e c i s i o n  1600, C a l i f o r n i a  W a t e r  R e s o u r c e s  C o n t r o l  B o a r d  ( J u n e  21,
1984).
241 Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 468-9.
242Water Market Update. 1 (December 1987): 2.
2 4 3 \ f a n y  a r g u e  t h a t  s e n d i n g  w a t e r  t o  s o u t h e r n  C a l i f o r n i a  i s  o n l y  
e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e  p r o b l e m .  A l l o w i n g  a  c i t y  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  g r o w  w e l l  b e y o n d  i t s  
m e a n s  t o  n a t u r a l l y  s u s t a i n  i t s e l f  h a s  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  b y  m a n y  t o  b e
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The conservation effort has been so successful that agricultural 
drainage and canal seepage that once flowed as ground water to the 
Salton Sea, the state's largest inland body of water, has substantially 
declined, causing the land locked sea to slowly shrink. The sea’s 
shrinkage coupled with the inevitable increase in the water’s salinity 
has outraged a handful of Californians who use the water body for 
recreational purposes. Even though it is an artificial c r e a t i o n , 2 4 4  the 
Salton Sea is viewed by many recreationalists as a valuable public 
resource worthy of state p r o t e c t i o n . 2 4 5  Once again, the boundaries of 
the Public Trust Doctrine are being tested in an effort to prevent the 
transfer of the water so that recreational interests can be protected. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that ditch seepage and other return 
flows can rarely be salvaged without adversely affecting other water 
users. As a result, many localized jurisdictions have created laws 
that flatly prohibit senior users from changing their water right in a 
way that would injure other water users in the basin, even if the 
basin is a r t i f i c i a l . 2 4 6  Other jurisdictions inhibit water conservation 
by allowing a transfer of irrigation rights only to the extent of 
historical crop c o n s u m p t i o n . 2 4 7  Consequently, if there are
irresponsible. They consider any transfer of water south to be in effect 
“feeding the fire" and encouraging more irresponsible development.
244The sea was once one of many end points for the “natural” Colorado 
River. However, with the construction of dams and the channelization of the 
river towards the Gulf of California, the river no longer empties into the 
Salton Sea. The Sea was artificially filled in 1905 when the Colorado River tore 
through a faulty diversion canal and flooding the ancient sea. The diversions 
through the All-American Canal have helped maintain the sea 's current 
lev e ls .
245Bill Karr, “The Environment Needs Water,” The Los Angeles Times. 26 
October 1989, B6.
2 4 6 C a l i f o m i a  W a t e r  C o d e  §§ 10505 a n d  10505.5 ( W e s t ' s  S u p p l e m e n t  1995).
247california Water Code § 10900 (West's Supplement 1995).
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irretrievable losses (for example through evaporation, weed 
transpiration, or irretrievable percolation), the irrigator is not 
entitled to salvage and market this portion of the water right. 
Therefore, improvements in irrigation efficiency that simply reduce 
return flows may not enable the investor to capture and sell the 
conserved water if those return flows had historically been used by 
others.
Current law regarding the marketing of salvaged water is 
extremely complex. In earlier times, lawmakers and judges were 
confronted with a much simpler situation, and were able to state 
with some certainty that the person who installs water saving 
devices is allowed to take the water thus saved. Such a statement 
was generally made after citing several old cases in which irrigators 
who installed pipes and lined ditches were given the right to utilize 
the former seepage l o s s e s . 2 4 8  Today, however, the process is 
different. The example of the HD s conservation contract with the 
MWD illustrates the greatest distributional problem associated with 
water marketing: protecting third-party interests. Californians have
very different ideas about how water should be used. Hence, 
protecting all of those interests through legislative action may be 
impossible. In an effort to assure adequate protection to third- 
parties, the legislature requires a series of extraordinarily difficult 
and expensive administrative steps to be taken before an out-of­
basin water transfer can be made.
248Richard W. Dickenson, "Installation of Water Saving Devices as a 
Means of Enlarging and Appropriative Right to Use of Water," N a tu ra l 
R ftsn iirces L aw  1 (1969): 2 7 2 , 285 .
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If a farmer in a federally supplied irrigation district wants to 
permanently transfer his conserved water to an environmental 
group for in-stream flow in the Sacramento River for endangered 
Chinook salmon, he must undertake a series of administrative steps 
before one drop of water can be transferred. First, he must obtain 
written approval from the following agencies: the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, the Secretary of the Interior, any third party 
whose conveyance facilities are used, the Department of Fish and 
Game, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Board of 
Supervisors from his irrigation d i s t r i c t , 2 4 9  possibly the Board of 
Supervisors from his county, the State Water Resources Control 
Board, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the Department of Water Resources. Second, 
he must comply with the stipulations of the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA), which include completing an environmental- 
impact report, and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 
which include compiling an environmental-impact s t a t e m e n t . 2 5 0
249^  predominant obstacle to water marketing and transfers is found in 
the scores of local water districts scattered throughout the state, especially 
those in agricultural areas. These districts tend to have rules prohibiting the 
transfer of water beyond their boundaries. It is their assumption that keeping 
all of the water in their district will assure the continued viability of their 
local economies. So far, working through the powerful Association of 
California Water Agencies, they have successfully resisted even those state 
legislative attempts to offer local economic and environmental protections in 
exchange for allowing individuals with more water than they need to sell to
customers outside a district. The attitude of the districts is summarized by this
statement of a Central Valley farmer as cited in The Los Angeles Times in June
of 1991: "Without a right to veto any such sale, nothing doing." Jennifer
Warren and Virginia Ellis, “State's Water Bank Doing Fine — Except for 
Buyers.” A l, A l l .
250£dward J. Tiedemann, ESQ., “Water Transfers in 1993: Relationships
between Federal, State, Local, and Individual Water Systems,” taken from CLE 
International conference on California Water Law, March 18-19, 1993 in San 
Francisco, California, 4, 6, and 7
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Third, he must pay the extra taxes levied against his transaction, 
such as the $25 per acre-foot tax that he must give to the federal
government and the $10.®̂  ̂ per acre-foot tax that he must give to his 
irrigation d i s t r i c t . ^ 5 1  Even then, he is not in the clear. The possible 
threat of a lawsuit from a downstream water user or a public trust 
interest may discourage him from redistributing the water even if he 
completes all of the fieldwork and paperwork. Legal fees and other 
investigative costs may also become substantial. Thus, the costs in 
terms of money and time involved in completing the transaction 
prohibit permanent water transfers from being worthwhile 
endeavours for many persons with excess s u p p l i e s . ^ 5 2  This fact was 
exemplified in 1986. Six years after the California Legislature 
enacted laws intended to move water allocation toward a free 
market, not a single drop of water was traded in the s t a t e . 2 5 3  The 
demand was there, but the transaction costs were simply too high.
The idea behind water markets is to encourage low-value 
water users to sell their water to higher-valued uses. In order to 
clarify the law and promote water use efficiency, the California 
Legislature has enacted a bill which sanctions the marketing and use 
of salvaged irrigation w a t e r . 2 5 4  Theoretically, by selling excess 
water, farmers will have financial motivation to monitor irrigation
251 Ibid. See also The Central Valley Project Improvement Act. Title 
XXXIV of Public Law 102-575 (1992).
25 2Tbere is, however, one exception. In sections 1725-1732 of the 
California Water Code, a tem po rary  change of transfer of one year or less is 
exempt from almost all state regulations. See Hart, California W ater Plan
U pdate . Vol. I, supra note 10, 39.
253Glenn F. Bunting, “Bid To Alter State’s Water Allocation Loses,” T he
T ng  A n g e l e s  Times. 22 May 1985, A3, A28.
254california Water Code § 1011 (West Supplement 1995).
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applications, observe each crops consumptive water use, and 
redesign overall farm management practices. Water markets might 
also encourage farmers to use less water-intensive crops and more 
efficient irrigation equipment and techniques. If water markets 
encourage better farm and water management practices, then 
perhaps these are grounds for breaking down transaction barriers 
and strongly encouraging market implementation. If water is 
conserved then the once "wasted" water can be reclaimed and then 
reallocated to other uses. Even though improvements to irrigation 
techniques and transfer processes could conserve enough water to 
satisfy all of the growing urban, environmental, and industrial 
demands well into the next century, there are many impediments to 
the free transfer of water rights which, in turn, diminish the 
incentives to conserve water in the first place. For instance, properly 
used drip irrigation systems will inherently diminish applied 
irrigation water, which will reduce runoff, which may reduce return 
flows, which may injure third-parties. Moreover, even if a farmer 
wanted to conserve water for personal reasons, purchasing the 
sophisticated technological equipment is often beyond his or her 
financial means. Therefore, Californians must explicitly define their 
goals for water resources in order to maintain long-term water 
resource stability.
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No-Injury and Area o f Origin Rules
The guiding principle for preventing third-party impacts in 
water transfers is the “No Injury R u l e . ”255 The rule states that the 
transfer must...
not injure any legal user of the water...through resulting 
significant changes in water quantity, water quality, timing of 
diversion or use, consumptive use of the water, reduction in 
return flows or reduction in the availability of water within the
watershed of the t r a n s f e r o r . 2  5  6
An interesting ramification of the appropriation system is that water 
rights are based solely upon the amount of water in a stream.
“Return flow” from applied irrigation water, in many cases, 
constitutes a substantial part of in-stream f l o w . 257 i n  fact, many 
water appropriations depend specifically upon the reliability of this 
return flow. Therefore, many downstream interests fear that 
salvaging historically wasted irrigation water upstream would 
ultimately affect their water r i g h t s . 258 The assumption here is that 
water that is applied to a farm during irrigation returns to the 
watershed as surface water. Could the water instead be percolating 
deep into aquifers, or staying attached to soil particles, or moving out 
of the basin as ground water flow? Assuming that applied irrigation
255California Water Code §§§ 1725, 1736, and 1792 (West Supplement 
1995). Also see McDonald v. Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining 
Company, 13 Cal. 220 (1896).
256California Water Code § 1725 (W est's Supplement 1995).
257sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 138-42, 
224-30, and 238-45.
258Steven J. Shupe, Gary D. Weatherford, and Elizabeth Checchio, 
"Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation," Natural Resources Journal.
29 (Spring 1989): 427-433.
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water migrates back into the stream channel above a junior user is in 
many cases unfounded. Hydrogeological studies for each individual 
diversion would be required to make an accurate determination.
Every drop of water in a water system serves some function. 
When water is extracted from a natural system, then that entire 
system functions differently. In the California Water Code, these 
hydrological problems are recognized in the “area of origin” 
s t a t u t e  s .  9  These laws were initially intended to assure areas of 
origin that any water needed for future economic growth and 
development would become available. However, today, the laws 
require that environmental damage associated with water extraction 
constitutes the extractor as liable. Section 1245 of the Water Code 
reads:
Every municipal corporation of this State, and every person, firm, or 
corporation...who enters any watershed...for the purpose of acquiring 
a water supply...shall be liable to all persons, firms and corporations, 
their heirs, representatives and successors...for all damage suffered or 
sustained by them either directly or indirectly because of injury, 
damage, destruction, or decrease in value of any such 
property...resulting from or caused by the taking of any such lands or 
waters, or by the taking, diverting or transporting of water from such
w atersh ed .260
Any region that can prove that a water transfer caused any injury 
can demand compensation. If, for instance, the recreation industry 
on the Upper Sacramento River could prove that the decreased 
Chinook salmon runs are a product of a lack of water in quantity
2 5 9 C a l i f o m i a  W a t e r  C o d e  § § § § § § § § §  1 2 1 5 - 1 2 2 0 ,  1 2 4 5 ,  1 0 5 0 5 ,  1 0 5 0 5 . 5 ,  
1 1 1 2 8 ,  1 1 4 6 0 - 1 1 4 6 3 ,  a n d  1 2 2 0 0 - 1 2 2 2 0  ( W e s t ' s  S u p p l e m e n t  1 9 9 5 ) .  
2 6 0 C a l i f o r n i a  W a t e r  C o d e  §  1 2 4 5  ( W e s t  S u p p l e m e n t  1 9 9 5 ) .
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and/or quality, and that the decrease in the salmon run is adversely 
affecting the tourist industry, then transferred water may be subject 
to recall. Any “taking” of water changes the dynamics of the stream 
system. Thus, increasing water transfers could have substantial 
unseen future impacts on both the economic and environmental 
well-being of a region of “origin.”
Ground Water Impacts
Protecting third-party interests in ground water is another 
external problem associated with water transfers. During the 
drought from 1987 to 1992, ground water overdraft became an 
unfortunate side effect of reduced Central Valley Project and State 
Water Project deliveries. For example, in the San Joaquin River 
hydrological region, ground water storage dropped by nearly five 
million acre-feet while in the Tulare Lake hydrological region, the 
water levels dropped by almost ten million a c r e - f e e t . I n  the 
environmental impact report (EIR) for the State Drought Water Bank, 
the Department of Water Resources identified eleven overdrafted 
ground water basins that would be adversely impacted by water 
transfers out of these r e g i o n s . ^ 6 2  However, they also claimed that 
“transfers involving ground water substitution are expected  to 
originate in basins that are not overdrafted” (emphasis a d d e d ) . 2 6 3  
Non-voluntary water transfers are already occurring out of those 
basins for environmental mitigation in the San Joaquin and
261 Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 107-10.
262Steve Macaulay, et. al., Department of Water Resources of the State of 
California, “Final Drought W ater Bank Environmental Impact Report,” 
(November 1993): 116-22.
263ibid., 116.
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Sacramento Delta drainage. Hence, if the farmers of the Central 
Valley substitute ground water for transferred water rights, then 
overdrafts will certainly expand.
Ground water overdrafts induced by trans-basin water 
transfers will have other negative side effects as well. Aggregated 
aquifer depletion may stress or kill many plant and animal species of 
the Central Valley. When the aquifers are depleted, many drought 
tolerant deep-rooted plant species, such as the Valley Oak, which are 
dependent upon upward capillary movement of ground water 
through the soil, will be deprived of vital water s o u r c e s . 2 6 4  As the 
native species die, animals dependent upon those plants for food and 
habitat may also perish. The ecoregion as a whole suffers from 
ground water overdraft, not just the agricultural community. As 
long as the current California ground-water policy remains, increased 
water transfers could inadvertently create substantial environmental 
degradation.
E nvironm enta l Im pacts
Adverse environmental impacts caused by water transfers are 
explicitly prohibited by the California Water C o d e . 2 6 5  Despite such 
prohibitions, according to Peter Moyle, a fishery biologist at the 
University of California at Davis, at the time Europeans first settled 
in California, 116 species of native fish inhabited its lakes and 
streams. Since then, eight have become extinct, fourteen are 
formally enlisted as endangered or threatened, twenty-eight qualify
264Ibid., 70-86. Other species possibly further threatened are the Blunt- 
Nosed Leopard Lizard, the California Kit Fox, and the Giant Garder Snake.
265California Water Code §§ 1725, 1736 (West Supplement 1995).
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for listing as endangered or threatened (table 4), and twenty-one are 
declining or occurring in small isolated populations requiring 
protective management. In total, sixty-three percent of all native 
fish are either permanently lost or require p r o t e c t i o n . 2 6 6  Likewise, 
the declines in native plant species probably double or even triple 
these figures. Nevertheless, many of these extinctions are a direct 
result of removing water from "origin" watersheds.
Water transfers through a market system could help enlarge 
the populations of many species of endangered and threatened 
animals. For example, since many of the threatened fish species 
require readily available supplies of fresh water, private 
organizations or government agencies could purchase the water 
necessary for transport to impacted regions. The government could 
even use its power of eminent domain if there were a water- 
shortage e m e r g e n c y . 2 6 7  The goal here is that both sides are 
rewarded. Environmentalists gain access to water resources 
necessary for species survival and farmers gain revenue by selling 
the water. The market can satisfy environmental demands.
Social Impacts
As agricultural water rights in California are slowly converted 
to municipal, urban, and environmental uses, questions of fairness in
266Kevin M. O ’Brien, “Endangered Species Issues—A panel discussion,” 
CLE International, San Francisco, March 18-19, 1993. Text of discussion from 
the National Heritage Institute.
267Eminent Domain is a power awarded to the states by the United States 
Constitution. It can be used for a variety of purposes, which specifically 
include taking property with just compensation for the protection statewide 
w e ll-b e in g .
Table 4.
Endangered and Threatened Species
1 1 2
Special Status Econom ically N ative
Soecles Imoortant Snecies Snecies
C hinook  Salm on Striped Bass W hite  S tu rgeon
D elta  Sm elt Pacific  H erring G reen  S tu rgeon
S acram en to  S p litta il A m erican  Shad S tarry  F lo u n d er
L ongfin  Sm elt D ungeness C rab C rangon  fra n c is c o ru m  
Crangon n igricauda  
T ule Perch
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redistribution are growing. Section 386 of the California Water Code 
states:
The [SWRCB] may approve any change associated with 
a transfer...only if it finds that the change may be made 
without...unreasonably affect[ing] the overall economy o f the 
area from which the water is being t r a n s f e r r e d . ^ ^ 8
Since, nearly all water transfers originate in rural communities, 
questions of fairness arise from the possibility that water transfers 
may adversely impact communities which rely upon agriculture to 
sustain their culture and economy. Many experts assert that even 
though rural-to-urban market transfers may appear economically 
efficient, there are significant hidden costs and social impacts not 
adequately reflected in market t r a n s a c t i o n s . 2 6 9  For example, some 
residents of rural counties are concerned over the possible erosion of 
local tax bases when significant amounts of productive land are 
taken out of irrigation or purchased for their water rights. Others 
are concerned that transferring water rights out of their counties 
may impoverish their social well-being and destroy their cultural 
heritage. Furthermore, rural residents complain that in many cases 
they have little or no authority in the decision-making process. As 
one farmworker said, “‘We have two ways to allocate things in the 
United States. We have money and we have votes. In both cases it’s 
the cities that have got it.”’270 The question, therefore, is: Are 
greater economic and social benefits for some communities more
268California Water Code § 386 (West Supplement 1995).
269saliba, Water M arkets, supra note 103, 191-99.
270Lori Olsewski, “Running Dry—Why Water Crisis W on’t End,” San 
f rpmriscn Chronicle. April 15, 1991. vol. 127, no 76, Al.
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desirable than sustaining and preserving the economy and cultural 
identity of rural communities?
Third Party Impacts
Large transfers of rights from rural to urban areas typically 
arouse heated d e b a t e s . 2 7 1 Permanent or temporary water transfers 
out of rural communities may increase the incidence of fallowed 
lands and, thereby, reduce agricultural productivity. As a result, the 
businesses that supplied the resources to produce the crops, the 
workers that relied upon the jobs provided in the fields and offices, 
and the community that relied upon the revenue generated by the 
harvest and taxes, may all be reduced, thereby draining the 
economic resources of the entire community. A recent San Francisco 
Chronicle article addressed the effect of idling a 500-acre cotton field 
(one of the lower-value, least labor-intensive irrigated crops) and 
determined that the reduction in the grower’s direct, in-community 
expenditures for inputs, including seed, fertilizer, pesticides, on-farm 
labor, fuel, equipment purchases and maintenance, and specialized 
contractors, amounts to approximately $614.®^ per acre, or a total of 
$307,080.®^ for the entire f a r m . 2 7 2  Some economists add a multiplier 
of two to four times, which exacerbates the impact upon rural 
communities even more. Another three-year study of water 
transfers, conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, concluded 
that:
271 Dunning, "Dam Fights," supra note 114, 25.
272cited in Ralph Santiago Abascal and William G. Hoerger, California 
Rural Legal Assistance. Memo to board of supervisors regarding Water 
Transfers and Assembly Bill 97. July 27, 1993.
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...where production in irrigated agriculture is reduced because of water 
transfers, the farmers that remain may be insufficient to support some 
or all of the local packing houses and seed, fertilizer, and machinery 
distributors...the community becomes less prosperous. The social 
structure weakens at a time when a rural community may badly need 
[it] to deal with economic change...Reduced job opportunities force 
people to move...[and] the economic viability of the community may be 
th re a te n e d .2 ^ ^
Unquestionably, reductions in crop production by local agronomists 
will most likely adversely affect rural communities.
Water-right transfers that reduce crop production threaten not 
only county tax bases, but also the overall economic health of rural 
areas. When productive agricultural acreage in an area is suddenly 
reduced, severe secondary economic impacts can debilitate the 
remaining farmers, as well as affect the businesses that supply and 
depend upon agricultural customers. State legislatures have been 
looking at ways of addressing the economic problems associated with 
transferring water out of rural regions. Some legislators have argued 
that in order to mitigate third-party repercussions, the state needs to 
limit water transfers by ten, twenty, or even thirty percent of the 
total amount annually consumed by a farmer’s c r o p . 274 However, 
since neither the state nor the farmer can accurately measure how 
much water his or her crop consumes, then the legal stipulation 
would be u n e n f o r c e a b l e . 275 Moreover, this approach seems
273ibi(j,
274cortese in assembly bill 97, Katz in assembly bill 52, and Costa in 
assembly bill 1605. Each bill had a stipulation taxing parties involved in water 
transfers in order to pay for job retraining and social programs in “origin” 
communities. All of the bills were defeated in the state assembly.
2 7 5 p e r h a p s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a s p e c t s  i n  t h e  d e b a t e  o n  
C a l i f o r n i a ’ s  w a t e r  s y s t e m  i s  t h a t  o f  w a t e r  m e a s u r e m e n t .  S i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  s o
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somewhat impractical, since the consumed water is the amount of 
water that produces  the crop, which, if decreased, would not benefit 
the farmer or the rural community. If the transfer process is going 
the be effective then the focus of regulatory mechanisms should be
on the amount of water that is wasted by poor irrigation and
management techniques. Still, enforcing legislative regulations on 
farmers on this large scale would be impractical and with the current 
minimization of the state's enforcement resources, probably 
im possible.
The arguments that water transfers will destroy rural 
economies are premised upon several assumptions. For one, the 
assumption that crop production will be reduced may be mistaken. 
Since California law allows farmers to substitute ground water for 
transferred surface water, one might conclude that with adequate 
pumping, there would be no economic disruption to a small 
community. Ground-water substitution would allow the crop
production to remain static and the community to remain intact. On
the other hand, water transfers out of areas where ground water is 
expensive to pump would probably reduce crop production, and 
thereby, endanger the economic and social stability of the 
community. Therefore, considering that water transfers out of rural
many variables associated with measuring water, deep percolation, 
évapotranspiration, soil retention, g roundw ater flow, capillary action, and 
surface water runoff, accurately monitoring where the water goes after an
application can only be generalized, but never perfectly measured over a 
large area. Thus, major aspects of water law, such as determining waste, crop
consumption, and return flows are extremely time consuming and almost
impossible. Moreover, measuring the amount of water transferred could pose
a problem, because, for example, the amount of water transferred from the 
Sacramento River will surely be more than the amount of water that will 
actually reach Southern California.
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communities could produce economic collapse, each transfer must be 
investigated on a case-by-case basis.
Even though ground-water substitution is legal, one of the 
primary objectives of creating a water market is to encourage 
farmers to conserve water through better management practices. 
Efficient water management requires either installation and proper 
utilization of more effective irrigation equipment or switching to 
higher-valued, less water-intensive crops. Therefore, theoretically, 
encouraging farmers to sell conserved water rather than the entire 
water right may, in fact, produce dual benefits to both the rural 
community and the farmer by increasing yields for the community 
and increasing revenue for the farmer. Others disagree, stating that 
changes in the type of crop or the methods of irrigation will reduce 
agricultural employment opportunities because the workers in rural 
communities are unable to adapt to changes in the agricultural 
outputs. Farmers who plant low-valued crops and wish to maintain 
soil fertility are forced to rotate three different crops every three 
y e a r s . 7̂6 Each of these crops require different irrigation and 
harvesting techniques. Likewise, third-parties associated with rural 
agriculture, such as workers and suppliers, have been forced to 
handle a variety of agricultural situations. Therefore, assuming that 
a change in the type of crop produced or the irrigation practice 
utilized is going to put people out of work may be misleading. The 
type of work may change slightly, but workers will still be needed.
276This rotation allows the soil to add nitrogen and other plant 
nutrients which would be far too expensive to apply, as chemical fertilizers, to 
low-valued crops every year.
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Two studies by the University of California at Davis and the 
RAND Corporation indicated that economic impacts of large, long­
term or permanent water transfers upon rural communities were 
generally within the range of normal economic fluctuations in the 
r e g i o n . 2 7 7  Even though some sectors, such as farm employment, 
were impacted more than others, both studies concluded that, while 
impacts were not large on a county-wide or regional basis, the 
incremental impacts were significant in an already depressed 
economy. However, if ground-water substitution for transferred 
water becomes outlawed or large transfers of water necessary for 
crop production become commonplace, then the economic and social 
conditions of communities that rely upon agricultural production will 
collapse as transfers increase. Therefore, as large-scale water 
transfers become more common, the economic impacts upon rural 
communities will probably increase as well.
In tergen eration a l C oncerns
A second social impact that is often overlooked is the effects of 
water transfers upon future generations. Water is an intertemporal 
resource that is necessary for human and ecological subsistence, both 
now and in the future. Deciding how much of the resource should be 
c o n s u m e d 2 7 8  now is, by the same token, deciding how much should
277Lioyd S. Dixon, Nancy Y. Moore, and Susan W. Schechter.
“California’s 1991 Drought Water Bank: Economic Impacts in the Selling
Regions,” Sacramento, California; RAND corp. 1993, 7-9. Holcomb, Valerie, 
ed., “Buying and Selling Water in California: Issues, Experience, and Policy
Options,” UCLA Extension Public Policy Program, November 12-13, 1992, 5.
278By consumed I mean that it is lost for an extended period to some use 
that as of this era cannot be retrieved and reused in its pre-consumption state.
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be left untouched for future generations.279 Water markets affix 
prices to water resources that reflect the current philosophies of 
today’s generation, while future generations are denied any input 
into the actions which might have fundamental impacts upon their 
well-being. Many natural-resource economists argue that if a price 
is established that reflects the real cost to society of current 
consumption, then the operation of resource policy can be left to the 
market to decide.280 Since such foresight is impossible and the 
market cannot represent the wishes of future generations, the state 
retains the obligation to protect these interests.281 Protecting the 
future public interest is an important responsibility of the presiding 
governm ent,282 especially since intergenerational conflict is moving 
to the forefront of the water-transfer discussion. With proper 
implementation, the market system, combined with governmental 
protectionism, can adequately assuage the water demands of current 
and future generations.
279john A. Mclnerney, "Natural Resource Economics: The Basic
Analytical Principles in the Economics of Environmental and Natural 
Resources Policy," edited by J. A. Butlin, Economics of Environmental and 
Natural Resources Policy 3rd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc,
1981), 30-40.
280jgg Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, Water Resource M anagement, 
supra note 85.
281 Victor Brajer, A1 Church, Ronald Cummings, and Phillip Farah, "The 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Water markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and 
Sovereignty Interests in the West," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989): 493.
This obligation of the state sounds like the protecting the public trust. I am 
advocating that the trust be protected, but not by the means that the 
legislature is not obligated to adhere to the law or its earlier decisions in 
protecting that trust. If the legislature fails to protect the public interest 
through legal means, then it must rectify its mistakes in the same manner as 
any citizen, by fixing them, not blaming others for the wrongdoing.
282(3aiifornia Water Code § 1255 (West Supplement 1995)
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S u m m a r y
As the need for water to meet new demands intensifies, 
pressure will increase to overrule cases and statutes which prohibit 
voluntary water transfers. It seems that even skeptics of market 
solutions must concede that voluntary elimination of waste will occur 
only where the volunteers receive the fruits of their labors. Recent 
California legislation expressly provides that conserved or reclaimed 
water may be "sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise transferred."28 3 
The purpose of these sections is to encourage efficient water 
management and equitable distribution in the public sector by 
encouraging those in the private sector to conserve or reclaim water 
for personal benefit. Even then, the California laws subject any 
water transfer to the usual procedures and mandates, including the 
obligation to not injure other appropriators,284 which will require 
each transfer to be separately investigated and e v a l u a t e d . 2 8 5
The fact is that the current situation of policies and laws does 
not encourage farmers to conserve water, so that excess water would 
be available for market trade. Federal and state water subsidies, 
unlimited access to ground water, ill-defined beneficial uses of 
appropriated water, unlimited access to riparian waters, and 
subsidized crops, all label water as an unimportant and abundant 
resource, when, in fact, it is not. Likewise, many rules governing 
water allocation and consumption were based upon information that 
has since proven unreasonable and is no longer appropriate for
283California Water Code § 1011 (West Supplement 1995); See also, id. at 
§§ 1010, 1012 (West Supplement 1995).
284Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 469-70.
285Department of Water Resources, "Water Transfers," supra note 105, 7.
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today’s water-distribution systems. Nevertheless, water is governed 
by a highly complex and developed set of rights and rules, and a 
comprehensive and complete market system cannot easily be 
superimposed upon that structurelle (table 5). It is this complexity 
and ambiguity of water law which hinders the free transfer of water 
rights to higher economic uses. Therefore, in order for voluntary and 
efficient redistribution to occur, water policy must be clear and 
concise while physical transfer barriers must be overcome.
286McCormick, "Institutional Barriers," supra note 2, 954.
Table 5.
Chronological Development of California Water Rights
1769 First permanent Spanish settlements established. W ater Rights
established by Spanish Law
1848 Gold discovered on the American River. Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo
signed, California ceded from Mexico, California republic established
1850 California granted statehood.
1851 Possessory Acts Passed California Legislature
1857 Maeris v. Bicknell case reaffirming prior appropriation
1859 McDonald v. Bear River Co. court ruled that appropriative water rights 
were independent of land rights and thereby transferable
1860 Legislature authorized the formation of levee and reclamation districts
1860 Kidd v. Laird court ruled that senior appropriators have obligations to
ju n io r appropria to rs
1884 Federal decision in W oodruff v. North Bloomfield, et al., requires
term ination of hydraulic mining debris discharges into California 
r i v e r s
1886 California Supreme Court decision in Lux v. Haggin reaffirms legal
preem inence of riparian rights.
1892 Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois modern foundation of Public Trust
D o c trin e
1893 Congress forms the California Debris Commission to clear mining
debris from rivers so channels will be navigable.
1902 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation established by the federal Reclamation Act.
1913 Los Angeles Aqueduct begins transferring water from Owen’s Valley
1923 Hetch Hetchy Valley flooded and EBMUD formed
1931 County of Origin Law passed
1933 Central Valley Project Act passed
1937 Passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
1940 Metropolitan Water District opens Colorado River Aqueduct
1945 State Water Resources Control Board created.
1951 State authorizes State W ater Project.
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Table 5 continued
1970 Passage of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
1972 California Legislature passes a Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
1973 First SWP deliveries to Southern California
1976 California experiences severe two-year drought.
1983 California Supreme Court, in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, rules that the Public Trust Doctrine applies to 
streams tributary to Mono Lake.
1986 Coordinated Operation agreement for CVP and SWP operations signed.
1987 Severe five year drought begins
1989 M etropolitan Water District and Imperial Irrigation District agree that
MWD will pay for agricultural water conservation projects and receive 
the water conserved.
1991 Drought Water Bank established
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS
C o n c lu s io n
The growth of industrial, urban, and environmental water 
demands, coupled with a long-standing tradition of poor water 
management has strained California’s current water allocation 
system nearly to the point of c o l l a p s e . 2 8 7  The substantial advances 
in scientific knowledge regarding hydrological systems have 
heightened the public's awareness of many of the environmental and 
socio-economic problems caused by water transfers. It is this 
additional awareness that has complicated the allocation process.
The result has been that the "old politics" of Anglo-Califomian water 
policy that encouraged dam construction and water consumption 
have been replaced with the "new politics" which emphasize 
conservation of water and reallocation to high-value u s e s . 2 8 8  These 
emerging ideologies have forced those considering water transfers to 
address both public and private interests. This research project has 
focused upon the strengths and weaknesses of California’s past water 
adjudication systems, the goals of an efficient and equitable
287xhe 1987-1992 drought exemplified this assertion. The city of Santa 
Barbara was declared a disaster area and was eventually forced to build a 
desalinization plant. Without the development of the drought water bank, 
many other cities would have suffered a similar fate.
288"This little water went to market," The Economist. 4 August 1990.
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allocation system, and two competing distributional systems: the
Public Trust Doctrine and water marketing.289
California Indians utilized a central authority to adjudicate and 
protect water resources. This efficient water distribution system was 
extremely effective because the culturally homogeneous tribal 
groups were rarely, if ever, threatened by internal competing public 
i n t e r e s t s . 2 9 0  When outside interests staked claims to water 
resources, violent conflicts developed and when the dispute was 
finally resolved, the “winner took all.” Thus, defending one public 
interest from other public interests was paramount to a groups 
cultural and physical survival. Moreover, the Indians expressed 
concern for intergenerational resource use by protecting and 
respecting their surrounding environment. In contemporary 
California society this moral obligation of the California Indians to 
protect the environment is becoming more accepted. Nevertheless, 
the protection provided by the central authority to both the 
environment and the group were exceptional, helping California 
Indians to preserve their water resources and cultural heritage for 
thousands of years.
The Spanish colonists failed in their attempts to utilize a similar 
political structure to that of the Indians. The Spanish central 
authority could neither pacify the diverging public interests of 
presidios, pueblos, and missions, nor control the destructive uses of 
common waters by private citizens.291 The failed policies of the
289howc, el. al, "Innovative Approaches," supra note 4. 
290Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35,
291 Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43,
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Spanish resulted from a lack of understanding of hydrological 
systems, an inability to represent all public interests in their 
government structure, and an inability to control the actions of 
private citizens. Despite the outcome of their policies, the Spanish 
legal principles that water must satisfy both public and private uses, 
and that private rights can be exercised within the realm of public 
goals had a tremendous influence upon contemporary generations of 
Californians.
The farmers, ranchers, and miners of California ignored the 
accomplishments and failures of the Indians and the Spanish, and 
developed their own form of water a d j u d i c a t i o n . 2 9 2  The 
decentralized political structure, which relied upon individual 
initiative, was mostly successful in allocating water resources to their 
highest valued u s e s . 2 9 3  Moreover, the decentralized structure briefly 
solved the competing interests problem by encouraging 
appropriators to divert water for the reasons they saw fit. However, 
individual short-term interests became more important than long­
term public interests and the policies and law of that time were 
unable to prevent many ensuing environmental and social 
p r o b l e m s . 2 9 4  Nevertheless, the motivating factor of individual gain 
created substantial technological and policy advances in water
292LitUefieId, “Water Rights,” supra note 73, 417.
2 9 3 jh e  uses to which I am referring are specifically private, including 
farming, ranching, and mining. The only high valued public use that had 
been identified was navigation. But not until the Gold Run case were the 
interconnection between public and private uses and the interconnection 
between navigable waters and non-navigable waters identified.
294% g environmental problems included massive sedimentation from 
hydraulic mining and the subsequent reduction and extinction in fish species. 
Socially, the appropriators were battling the riparians and the corporate 
miners were destroying the small mining claims.
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resource adjudication which ultimately led to the construction of the 
largest water distribution system in the world.
The water allocation problems of contemporary Californians are 
hardly different than those of the Indians, Spanish, or Forty-Niners: 
water must be allocated to societies highest-valued uses. California’s 
current adjudication problems most closely resemble those of the 
Spanish experience. Public interests are strongly divided among 
preservationists, conservationists, and developers, while public- 
policy trends indicate a strong push towards a centralized 
a u t h o r i t y . 2 9 5  As a result, like the Spanish experience, many 
Californians have become disillusioned with the allocation system, 
viewing the government as the problem rather than the solution.
The lessons provided by history are, therefore, that in order to attain 
efficiency in allocation and equity in distribution, Californians must 
either endorse a moral and ethical obligation to each other and the 
environment, or must formulate a public policy that integrates 
divergent public interests into a free market allocation system. Both 
would accomplish the same goals, but the latter would be the most 
practical at this time.
S o lu t io n
As mentioned above, the five characteristics of the water- 
allocation model are: flexibility, secure expectations, opportunity
costs, predictability, and fairness. The Public Trust Doctrine satisfies 
several criteria associated with this model. First of all, the trust is
295xhe Audubon case exemplifies this assertion. The government is 
reasserting control of all of the state’s navigable and non-navigable water 
resources through the Public Trust Doctrine.
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relatively flexible in that it allows water to be transferred to new 
uses through judicial decree. Theoretically, the court ordered 
reallocations satisfy the uses that the court believes society wants at 
a given point in time. As societies goals change, however, the court 
reserves the right to reallocate water to new public uses. Therefore, 
although the involuntary reallocation system may be flexible, it 
comes at the expense of stability, predictability, and secure 
expectations for the codified law can be neutralized in the name of 
public demand.
Water markets are also considered to be flexible allocation 
systems. As long as there is a sufficient infrastructure in place, 
water can be quickly transported to various locations for various 
purposes in response to changing economic needs. However, if there 
is no infrastructure in place, as is the case in many parts of rural 
California, then the market would not be as flexible, and the 
possibility of other detrimental side-effects could result. In fact, 
insufficient infrastructure could severely limit the supply of water 
available for transfer and thereby artificially increase costs, 
excluding “would-be” buyers from the market. Limited access to the 
system inevitably leads to unfair distribution.
The Public Trust Doctrine is also considered by many to be a 
fair method of water allocation because it attempts to incorporate a 
variety of public interests into one universal law. They argue that 
the court-ordered decrees can most effectively represent the 
interests of the majority. Yet, this apparent societal equity is often 
biased against individuals or public groups that the court is also
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sworn to protect.296 por example, even though water is not a vested 
property right, many other vested private rights (such as land) are 
directly related to use of the water. Thus, diminishing the water 
right without compensation, diminishes the value of private land and 
could be considered a taking. If water resources are allocated by the 
court in an effort to pacify volatile public opinions, then any vested 
interests associated with the public water resources are no longer 
secure. If the Public Trust Doctrine allows the courts to circumvent 
codified law, including California’s Constitution, what rules are the 
farmers, industrialists, and environmentalists expected to obey?
Weakening secure expectations through the Public Trust 
Doctrine eliminates other aspects of the water-allocation model as 
well. First, creating uncertainty by thwarting expectations 
discourages personal initiative which would otherwise encourage 
many water users to search for new opportunities to reduce water 
consumption. If one would not gain personal rewards (such as 
money) for exploring and experimenting with other management 
opportunities, then what motivation is their to pursue them?297 
Second, reducing a person's desire to conserve water will reduce the 
physical flexibility of the allocation system, for excess or wasted 
water will not be easily identified and recovered. Even though 
involuntary transfers may readjudicate water resources, allowing 
extra parties to dictate the ultimate destination of the water would 
reduce response times and, therefore, be less efficient than a two-
296unitcd States Constitution Article IV. The idea of governmental 
takings is perhaps the most controversial issue in the Public Trust Doctrine.
297Some argue that the fear o f losing one's water rights will encourage 
water users to pursue better management techniques. This intimidation is 
called “police power.”
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party allocation system. Third, since the rules of allocation are not 
articulated in the Public Trust Doctrine, the predictability of the law 
would be undermined. Finally, weakening expectations is unfair to 
those who have vested interests in the use of water. Rectifying 
mistakes of past legislative decisions, as was done in the Audubon  
case, by disregarding the written law in the name of the common 
good is neither fair nor rational and it weakens expectations in 
water-resource management.
Functioning water markets keep expectations secure among 
buyers and sellers as long as they follow the written rules of the law. 
However, in many cases, the unpredictability of the interpretation of 
the law, such as “area of origin” statutes or the “no injury rule,” break 
down these expectations in a similar manner as that of the Public 
Trust Doctrine, destroying the distinction between right and wrong. 
Thus, the ambiguity of the written law can undermine voluntary 
redistribution through the free-market system as much as the Public 
Trust Doctrine. Similarly, the expectations of individuals and 
communities reliant on the products of water use could also be 
destroyed. If permanent sales of water rights become the norm, 
communities once associated with those rights could be 
impoverished. However, if a small fraction of those water rights are 
transferred or if transferred surface-water is replaced by ground­
water then the community should remain financially solvent, and 
therefore, socially intact.
Water markets could motivate individuals to identify 
opportunity costs and incorporate more efficient water uses. If, for 
example, a farmer could identify a means of conserving water so that
131
the salvaged water could be resold, then the discovery of new water 
saving opportunities could become a significant step in reallocation 
from agricultural to other high-value uses. Moreover, creative 
approaches to water use, such as "allocations with complementary 
uses" or trading reclaimed water for higher quality water, could 
substantially benefit many different segments of society.
Downplaying the importance of personal initiative and human 
ingenuity associated with identifying opportunity costs would be 
detrimental to any reallocation system.
Since the expectations of private water users and external 
parties associated with the water use are in conflict, the fairness of 
the water-market system must be questioned. This distributional 
consideration is extremely complex, but essentially rests upon the 
definition of "beneficial and reasonable use,” the foundation of a 
private water right which is intended to preserve both public and 
private interests. Water rights are not vested property rights, but 
using the water is a private interest and should not necessarily be 
subject to overbearing public regulation. A functioning water market 
would encourage all people to actively participate, allowing every 
person the chance to purchase water for a private beneficial and 
reasonable u s e . 298 Likewise, the government, rather than taking 
without compensation, could purchase water for certain public
298valerie Holcomb, ed., "Buying and Selling Water in California:
Issues, Experience, and Policy Options," UCLA Extension Public Policy 
Program, November 12-13, 1992, 14. She stated that water markets will actually 
empower rural communities because they will be n the bargaining position 
for thirsty (rich) cities who desperately need water. The example of the MWD 
and IID interaction showed that the farmers received not only a better 
distribution system but, money from selling the excess water to the urban 
d is tr ic t .
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interests to which they would be held accountable. If a seller 
refused to sell its water to the government, then the government 
could exercise its power of eminent dommn. Water markets ensure 
fair distribution by securing expectations among primary, secondary, 
and tertiary water users by allowing them to actively participate in 
the market and the government.
The guiding principle of both the Public Trust Doctrine and 
water marketing is that they seek to protect certain public or private 
interests from poor water management decisions by the state 
government while simultaneously reallocating water to its highest 
valued uses. Proponents of the public trust argue that the courts 
make the best allocation decisions while those who favor water 
marketing assert that individuals pursuing their own interests make 
the best allocation decisions. The proper solution would be for the 
legislature to establish criteria that courts may apply in resolving 
public trust controversies, while maintaining a free-market allocation 
s y s t e m . 2 9 9  jf  ̂ farmer can sell a portion of water and gain that 
capital, he could irrigate as much acreage as before, but more 
e f f i c i e n t l y . 3 0 0  Anything that discourages market efficiency by 
prohibiting transfers of surplus or conserved water to other users is 
wasteful. The major difficulty with expanding water markets and 
improving their efficiency lies in the fact that the public interests are 
flexible and ill-defined, which in turn leads to a lack of definition and 
certainty with respect to the marketable private rights. Successful
299Roderick E, Walston, "The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights 
Context," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989); 590.
300Valerie Holcomb, ed., "Buying and Selling Water in California: 
Issues, Experience, and Policy Options," UCLA Extension Public Policy 
Program, November 12-13, 1992, 12.
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development of a water market relies upon the establishment of 
clearly defined water rights, the high reliability of supply, a well 
developed distribution system, a large number and diversity of 
market participants, and especially to institutional rules and 
administrative procedures that minimize transfer restrictions and 
transaction costs.301
More generally, water transfers are simply a topic whose time 
has arrived. Current political and social moods have strengthened 
this movement. Contemporary opinions view government regulation 
as anathema, and advance the marketplace as the solution to many 
efficiency and distribution problems. While the marketplace will 
probably not fulfill the wishes of the entire public, market solutions 
to water problems are receiving serious consideration, in turn giving 
prominence to questions involving t r a n s f e r s . 3 0 2  jf water markets 
can encourage better farm management, more public involvement in 
government decision-making, and better public and private water 
management practices, then perhaps these are grounds for 
immediate water market implementation.
301 McCormick, "Institutional Barriers," supra note 2, 960. 
302Gould. "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 459.
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APPENDIX A
List of Acronyms
OCWD Calaveras County Water District
GOA Coordinated Operation Agreement
CVP Central Valley Project
DWR Department of Water Resources
EBMUD East Bay Municipal Utilities District
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
IID Imperial Irrigation District
LADWP Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
MAP Million Acre Feet
MCWA Monterey County Water Agency
MID Merced Irrigation District
MWD Metropolitan Water District
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
PCWA Placer County Water Agency
PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric
SCE Southern California Edison Company
SMUD Sacramento Municipal Utility District
SSWD South Sutter Water District
SWP State Water Project
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Table 1 continued
SWRCB State Water Resources Control Board
TID Turlock Irrigation District
USER United States Bureau of Reclamation
USŒ United States Army Corps of Engineers
YCPCWCD Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
YCWA Yuba County Water Agency
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